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Abstract
The quantitative easing (QE) policies implemented in recent years by central banks have had 
a profound impact on the working of money markets, giving rise to large excess reserves 
and pushing down key interbank rates against their fl oor – the interest rate on reserves. 
With macroeconomic fundamentals improving, central banks now face the dilemma as to 
whether to maintain this large balance sheet/fl oor system, or else to reduce their balance 
sheet size towards pre-crisis trends and operate traditional corridor systems. We address 
this issue using a New Keynesian model featuring heterogeneous banks that trade funds 
in an interbank market characterized by matching frictions. In this environment, balance 
sheet expansions push market rates towards their fl oor by slackening the interbank market. 
A large balance sheet regime is found to deliver ampler “policy space” by widening the 
steady-state distance between the interest on reserves and its effective lower bound (ELB). 
Nonetheless, a lean-balance-sheet regime that resorts to temporary but prompt QE in 
response to recessions severe enough for the ELB to bind achieves similar stabilization 
and welfare outcomes as a large-balance-sheet regime in which interest-rate policy is the 
primary adjustment margin thanks to the larger policy space.
Keywords: central bank balance sheet, interbank market, search and matching frictions, 
reserves, zero lower bound.
JEL classifi cation: E42, E44, E52, G21.
Resumen
Las políticas de compra de activos (QE, por sus siglas en inglés) implementadas en los últimos 
años por los bancos centrales han tenido un impacto profundo en el funcionamiento de los 
mercados monetarios, dando lugar a un gran exceso de reservas bancarias y presionando 
los tipos de interés interbancarios contra su suelo: el tipo de interés de las reservas. Con 
la mejora de los fundamentos macroeconómicos, los bancos centrales ahora se enfrentan 
al dilema sobre si mantener este «sistema suelo» con un balance grande, o bien reducir el 
tamaño de su balance a niveles previos a la crisis y operar así un sistema de pasillo de 
tipos de interés. Abordamos este problema utilizando un modelo neokeynesiano con 
bancos heterogéneos que se prestan fondos en un mercado interbancario caracterizado por 
fricciones de emparejamiento. En este entorno, las expansiones del balance del banco central 
empujan los tipos de mercado a su suelo al aumentar la liquidez en el mercado interbancario. 
Demostramos que un régimen de balance grande ofrece más «espacio para tipos» al ampliar 
la distancia entre el tipo de interés de las reservas y su límite inferior («cota inferior efectiva» 
o ELB, por sus siglas en inglés). No obstante, un régimen de balance pequeño que recurre 
a QE temporal pero rápido en casos de recesiones severas logra resultados similares de 
estabilización y bienestar a un régimen de balance grande en el que los tipos de interés 
ofi ciales son el margen de ajuste principal gracias al mayor «espacio para tipos».
Palabras clave: balance del banco central, mercado interbancario, fricciones de búsqueda 
y emparejamiento, reservas, cota inferior de los tipos de interés.
Códigos JEL: E42, E44, E52, G21.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession forced central banks across the industrialized
world to put in place quantitative easing (QE) policies that led to a massive increase in the size
of their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, balance sheet expansion has taken the form of an
unprecedented increase in aggregate excess reserves. In turn, such an increase in excess liquidity
has put downward pressure on overnight interbank market rates, to the point that they have been
pushed towards their floor — the interest paid on excess reserves by the respective central banks,
which has thus become basically the sole determinant of such interbank rates in recent years.
This ‘large balance sheet regime’ or ‘floor system’ represents a change in paradigm as regards
the conduct of monetary policy vis-à-vis the one prevailing before the crisis, characterized by
relatively small central bank balance sheets, near-zero aggregate excess reserves, and interbank
rates in between the interest rates paid and charged by central banks on excess reserves and on
their marginal lending, respectively (‘lean balance sheet regime’, or ‘corridor system’).
Figure 1 illustrates these developments for the case of the euro area. Before the crisis, the
EONIA — the main index of interest rates on overnight loans in the euro area interbank market —
remained very close to the middle of the corridor formed by the interest rates of the ECB’s deposit
and marginal lending facilities. Also, reserves in excess of regulatory requirements were negligible.
Following the first large-scale liquidity injections put in place in the context of the recent crisis,
the EONIA shifted towards the lower bound of the interest rate corridor, i.e. the deposit facility
rate, as excess reserves scaled up to historical highs at that time. The launch of the large-scale
asset purchase program in February 2015 consolidated the new large-balance-sheet/floor regime.
As macroeconomic fundamentals slowly but steadily improve across many advanced economies,
monetary policy-makers now face the dilemma as to whether to reduce the size of their balance
sheets towards pre-crisis trends and return to the corridor system, or else whether to continue
operating under the current floor system. This issue has drawn much attention in recent times
both in academia and policy circles.1 However, formal analyses in the context of well-suited
theoretical models are relatively scarce.
In this paper, we propose a relatively simple general equilibrium model designed to compare
the stabilization and welfare properties of (a) the pre-crisis lean balance sheet regime and (b) the
post-crisis floor system with a large balance sheet. Our framework departs from the standard
New Keynesian DSGE model in two key dimensions. First, in order to motivate the existence
of an interbank market, we introduce banks that collect deposits from households and have the
possibility of lending to nonfinancial firms. Banks receive idiosyncratic shocks to the return that
they can expect from the latter investment. As a result, some banks endogenously choose to borrow
1See e.g. Bernanke (2016) and Bullard (2017).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
Figure 1: This figure shows the ECB interest rates and its balance sheet since the introduction of
the Euro. Excess reserves are both excess reserves in current accounts as well as deposits at the
deposit facility.
2In particular, our modelling of banks shares many features with Buera and Moll’s (2015) modelling of entrepre-
neurs in a real framework, where the latter receive iid idiosyncratic shocks to the future return on their investments
and can borrow from other entrepreneurs subject to an exogenous leverage constraint.
3See e.g. Afonso and Lagos (2015), Armenter and Lester (2017), Atkeson, Eisfeldt and Weill (2015), Bech and
Monnet (2016), and Bianchi and Bigio (2017).
in the interbank market so as to finance their lending to firms, and some others will choose to lend
in the same market or to hold government bonds.2 Second, following a recent literature, we capture
the bilateral trading nature of the interbank market by assuming that the latter is characterized by
search and matching frictions.3 Every period, lending and borrowing banks search for each other
and, upon matching, trade interbank loans, with the central bank’s deposit and lending facilities
as the outside option for lending and borrowing banks, respectively. As a result, the equilibrium
interbank rate falls inside the interest rate corridor formed by the deposit and lending facility rates.
Crucially, its actual position within this corridor is determined by the tightness of the interbank
market, i.e. the ratio between demand and supply of interbank funds. In this setup, bank reserves
are therefore the residual funds that lending banks are not able to place in the interbank market.
On the analytical front, we show that the size of the central bank’s balance sheet plays a key role
in determining outcomes in the interbank market. On the assets side, the central bank purchases
long-term government bonds and, through its lending facility, provides funding to borrowing banks
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that fail to find lenders in the interbank market. Its liabilities are banks’ reserves at the deposit
facility. An expansion of the central bank balance sheet through bond purchases produces ceteris
paribus a symmetric fall in banks’ bond holdings and a corresponding increase of the amount
of funds available for lending to other banks. The resulting slackening in the interbank market
improves the market position of borrowing banks and compresses the spread between the interbank
rate and the deposit facility rate. We refer to this novel mechanism as the ‘interbank transmission
channel’ of balance-sheet expansions. The interbank market slackening also makes it harder for
lending banks to find suitable trading partners, thus forcing them to keep a larger proportion of
their excess funds at the deposit facility. Therefore, asset purchases produce both an increase in
reserves and a reduction in the gap between interbank rates and the interest on reserves.
We also show analytically that, compared to the lean balance sheet/corridor regime, the large
balance sheet/floor regime delivers a steady-state deposit facility rate that is higher and therefore
further away from its effective lower bound (ELB). In other words, the floor system allows for
ampler ’policy space’ for conventional monetary policy in the face of economic downturns. The
reason is as follows. In the steady state of our model, real market interest rates are independent of
the central bank’s balance sheet size — as are nominal market rates, for given inflation target.4 As a
result, the shrinkage of the spread between the latter rates and the interest on reserves that comes
with a floor regime is reflected, not in lower market rates, but in a higher interest on reserves.
On the numerical front, we calibrate our model to the euro area, showing that it replicates
well the observed relationship between excess reserves and the spread between the interbank and
deposit facility rates since 1999, including both the pre-crisis period — with basically zero excess
reserves and a stable spread around 1%, i.e. half of the pre-crisis corridor width — and the recent
period characterized by large excess reserves and a near-zero spread.
As mentioned before, our main interest is to compare the stabilization and welfare properties
of both monetary policy regimes. We first perform a comparative statics exercise in which we
vary the permanent size of the central bank’s balance sheet, and show that a larger balance sheet
increases steady-state welfare monotonically. This is despite the fact that neither central bank
asset purchases per se nor the reserves resulting from these purchases fulfill any socially useful
role. The reason is that an expansion of excess reserves and the ensuing slackness in the interbank
market raises borrowers’ matching probability to the point of essentially eliminating their recourse
to the central bank’s lending facility. This in turn reduces the central bank’s seigniorage, which
4As in standard DSGE models, in the steady state of our model the real interest rate that determines the
representative household’s consumption and saving decisions — here, the real interest earned on its deposits —
equals its rate of time preference. Under certain conditions, the steady-state interbank rate is exactly equal to the
household deposit rate, and is hence independent of the size of the central bank’s balance-sheet. More generally,
in more complex models (e.g. OLG-models) the steady-state market interest rates may also depend on structural
factors other than the rate of time preference. What matters for our argument though is that the steady-state
market real rate is independent of monetary policy, as is typically the case in such models.
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acts as a distortionary tax on the banking sector as a whole. Nonetheless, quantitatively the welfare
gains from moving from a lean- to a large-balance-sheet steady state are negligible, because in the
former steady state seigniorage is very limited to begin with.
Turning to stabilization properties, we next analyze the usefulness of different central bank
balance sheet regimes under severe recessions in which interest-rate policy is constrained by the
ELB, as has been the case across many advanced economies during and after the Great Recession.
For this purpose, we consider a crisis scenario driven by an exogenous time preference shock. The
shock drives the central bank’s deposit facility rate against its ELB, thus preventing further (con-
ventional) monetary accommodation for some time. Against the backdrop of this crisis scenario,
and starting from a lean balance sheet, we show that a temporary asset purchase program can
reduce the severity of the recession through the above-explained interbank transmission channel:
Central bank bond purchases reduce the amount of funds that inactive banks can invest in bonds
and hence increases their supply of funds to the interbank market. This slackening of the interbank
market in turn pushes rates down, all the way to their floor. Since interbank rates are a key de-
terminant of effective lending and borrowing rates for the real economy, both aggregate economic
activity and welfare improve relative to the baseline scenario without asset purchases.
How do these outcomes change in a floor system? As mentioned before, the latter system
features higher steady-state interest on reserve and hence more space to cut it before hitting the
ELB. We show that in such a regime, a reduction in policy rates in response to the crisis is
enough to achieve stabilization outcomes very similar to those of the lean-balance-sheet regime
with temporary QE. An important qualification of this result is that, for the latter regime to
perform as well as the large-balance-sheet one in the face of a severe shock, the QE measures
must be implemented as soon as the ELB would bind in the absence of QE. Indeed, we show that
a corridor scenario with delayed QE loses much effectiveness relative to the floor system. Our
analysis thus suggests that, in contexts in which the central bank may not be capable of/willing
to implement QE policies in a prompt and decisive manner (e.g. due to implementation lags or
institutional constraints) when conventional monetary policy exhausts its room for manoeuvre, a
floor regime may achieve better stabilization outcomes thanks to the enlarged space for interest-rate
policy.
Finally, our baseline analysis assumes for simplicity that balance-sheet policies take the form
of bond purchases on the assets side. In the context of a model extension where the central bank
can also engage in large-scale credit operations with banks, we show that the expansionary effects
of balance sheet policies are essentially the same regardless of whether the central bank provides
liquidity by purchasing bonds or through credit operations.5 While we do not believe that in
5Unlike bond purchases, which as explained before free up resources in lending banks’ balance sheets and hence
increase the supply of interbank funds, central bank credit operations instead reduce borrowing banks’ funding
needs and hence the demand of interbank funds. But their effect on interbank market tightness is essentially the
same, hence the similarity of their effects.
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practice both policies are necessarily equally effective or operate through the same channels, we
do stress the notion that, insofar as they have similar implications for the liabilities side of the
central bank balance sheet, their effects through the specific interbank channel we analyze here
should also be similar.
Literature review. Our paper contributes to several strands of literature within the realm of
DSGE models of monetary policy transmission. In analyzing the central bank’s balance sheet as
an instrument of monetary policy, we contribute to a by now large literature, of which Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010, GK10), Gertler and Karadi (2011, GK11 and 2013, GK13), Cúrdia and Woodford
(2011, CW) and Chen, Cúrdia and Ferrero (2012, CCF) are some prominent examples. We depart
from these important contributions both in terms of modelling and in focus. As regards modelling,
unlike in the latter papers (except GK10) we explicitly model the interbank market, which is a
key ingredient in our analysis. Unlike in GK10, the interbank market in our framework emerges
endogenously as a result of idiosyncratic shocks to the prospective return on banks’ investments
projects. More importantly for our purposes, our interbank market is characterized by match-
ing frictions, which, as explained before, allows balance sheet policies to endogenously affect the
position of interbank (and other) market rates inside the policy rate corridor. In terms of focus,
none of the above papers compares the pre-crisis corridor system with the current floor system in
a macroeconomic model with both deposit and lending central bank facilities. Furthermore, the
mechanism through which balance sheet policies have effects is fundamentally different. In GK11
and GK13, central bank asset purchases reduce excess returns on the acquired assets by relaxing
banks’ leverage constraints. In CCF, transaction costs and segmented markets allow purchases of
long-term government bonds to be effective by compressing term premia. In CW, asset purchases
reduce credit spreads both by lowering banks’ intermediation costs and by creating reserves which
further reduce intermediation costs.6 In our setup, by contrast, such policies are effective because,
by raising the relative supply of funds in the (frictional) interbank market, they compress the
spread between short-term market interest rates and the floor of the interest rate corridor.
In analyzing the transmission of balance-sheet policies in a dynamic model with an endogenous
market for interbank loans characterized by matching frictions, our analysis is also related to
Bianchi and Bigio (2017, BB). An important difference is how we motivate the existence of the
interbank market. As mentioned before, in our framework the interbank market emerges as a result
of heterogeneous investment opportunities across banks. In BB, banks instead receive idiosyncratic
withdrawal shocks which, coupled with mandatory reserve requirements, lead those banks with
excess reserves to lend federal funds to those other banks with liquidity shortfalls. Also, we place
our interbank market substructure into an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model, which
6Ireland (2014) proposes a New Keynesian model where banks’ demand for reserves arises due to their role as
an input in the production of banking services.
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allows us to analyze the extent to which balance sheet policies complement conventional interest
rate policies in binding-ELB situations. Finally, our paper largely differs in focus. Bianchi and
Bigio (2017) use their framework to study the determinants of the decline in bank lending during
the recent financial crisis. By contrast, we focus on the comparison between the lean-balance-
sheet/corridor system that prevailed before the crisis and the current large-balance-sheet/floor
regime (still) prevailing in the largest industrialized economies.7
Finally our theory relates to the empirical literature on the effects of balance sheet policies.
Most of this literature finds that asset purchases, which go hand in hand with reserve creation, are
effective as a monetary policy tool. We do not aim here at summarizing this large and increasing
literature. Within the latter, however, we note that the evidence in Christensen and Krogstrup
(2018) speaks directly in favour of the transmission channel we model here. They document that
even those balance sheet policies which do not withdraw long term assets from the market, but
increase the stock of reserves by either reducing the supply of other central bank debt or by
purchasing other short term assets, have an impact on market interest rates.8 Also related are the
empirical findings in Reis (2016), according to which the first QE program in the US was effective
at raising expected inflation but subsequent QE rounds were not. As we show in the last section,
our model offers a result in a similar vein: a given balance sheet expansion is less effective at
stimulating the macroeconomy the higher the starting balance-sheet size is.
2 Model
Time is discrete. The economy is composed of households, nonfinancial firms (intermediate-good
firms, final-good producers and retailers), banks, the central bank and the government.
2.1 Households
The representative household’s utility is
E0
∞
t=0
βt [u(Ct)− v(Lt)] ,
7Armenter and Lester (2017) analyze the current configuration of the US money market setup, with both a
reserve facility for banks and a reverse-repo facility for nonbanks, in a two-period, partial equilibrium model with
matching frictions. While being very different in modelling and scope, we follow them in assuming competitive
search in the money (interbank) market, which allows us to characterize the dependence of the interbank market
rate on its tightness in extremely simple terms.
8Christensen and Krogstrup (2017) build a simple partial equilibrium model of portfolio balance channels that
can account for the reserves-induced effects of QE documented in their empirical work.
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where Ct is consumption, Lt is labor supply and β is the household’s discount factor. In addition
to consuming and supplying labor, households save in the form of bank deposits, the real value of
which is denoted by Dt. They also build new capital goods Kt using the technology
Kt =

1− S


It
It−1

It + (1− δ)Ωt−1Kt−1,
where Λt,t+1 = β
u(Ct+1)
u(Ct)
is the stochastic discount factor and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1− 1 is the inflation rate.
We assume that all private agents in the economy (households, banks, and firms) can save in a
non-modelled technology (‘mattress’ or ’vault’) at a net nominal rate −κ, where κ ≥ 0. Therefore
there is an effective lower bound (ELB) on all gross nominal interest rates, given by 1− κ.
2.2 Intermediate good firms
We assume that intermediate good firms (and banks) are segmented across a continuum of ’islands’,
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The representative firm on island j is perfectly competitive and produces
units of the intermediate good, Y jt , according to a Cobb-Douglas technology,
Y jt = Zt(ω
j
t−1K
j
t−1)
α(Ljt)
1−α, (2)
where It are final goods used for investment purposes, and (1− δ)Ωt−1Kt−1 is depreciated effective
capital repurchased from firms after production in period t; in the latter term, δ is the depreciation
rate and Ωt−1 is an effective capital index, to be defined below, which the household takes as given.
The function S satisfies S(1) = S (1) = 0 and S (1) ≡ ζ > 0. The budget constraint is
Ct + It +Dt = WtLt +
RDt−1
Pt/Pt−1
Dt−1 +Q
K
t

1− S


It
It−1

It +

s=R,B
Πst − Tt,
where Pt is the aggregate price level, RDt−1 is the riskless gross deposit rate,Wt is the real wage, Q
K
t
is the real price of capital goods, {Πst}s=R,B are lump-sum real dividend payments from the house-
hold’s ownership of retailers (s = R) and banks (s = B), and Tt are lump-sum taxes. The first
order conditions are standard,
1 = EtΛt,t+1
RDt
1 + πt+1
, Wt =
v(Lt)
u(Ct)
, (1)
1 = QKt

1− S


It
It−1

− S 


It
It−1

It
It−1

+ EtΛt,t+1QKt+1S 


It+1
It


It+1
It
2
,
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where Zt is an exogenous aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) process, L
j
t is labor, K
j
t−1
is the pre-determined stock of installed capital, and ωjt−1 is an island-specific shock to effective
capital.
The timing is as follows: At the end of period t − 1 each firm j learns the realization of the
shock to next period’s effective capital, ωjt−1. These shocks are iid over time and across islands,
and have cumulative distribution function F (ω). At this point each firm needs to install capital on
its island, which it buys from the household at unit price QKt−1. In order to finance this purchase,
the firm must obtain funding from its local bank. As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler
and Karadi (2011), we assume that the firm sells to the bank one unit of equity Ajt−1 per unit of
capital acquired: Ajt−1 = K
j
t−1. Equity is a perfectly state-contingent claim on the future return
from one unit of capital and is traded at price QA,jt−1. By perfect competition, the price of the
capital good and of equity coincide (QKt−1 = Q
A,j
t−1), and therefore Q
K
t−1K
j
t−1 = Q
K
t−1A
j
t−1. Finally,
at the beginning of period t, the firm hires labor and produces.
Each firm j chooses labor in order to maximize operating profits, P Yt Y
j
t − PtWtLjt , subject to
(2), where P Yt is the price of the intermediate good. The first order condition with respect to labor
implies that the effective capital-labor ratio is equalized across islands,
ωjt−1K
j
t−1
Ljt
=


Wt
MCt (1− α)Zt
1/α
, (3)
for all j, where MCt ≡ P Yt /Pt is the inverse of the average gross markup of final goods prices
over the intermediate good price, as explained below. The firm’s nominal profits then equal
P Yt Y
j
t − PtWtLjt = PtRktω
j
t−1K
j
t−1, where
Rkt ≡ αMCtZt

(1− α)MCtZt
Wt
(1−α)/α
is the common real return on effective capital. After production, the firm sells the depreciated
effective capital (1− δ)ωjt−1K
j
t−1 to households at unit price Q
K
t . The total real cash flow from
the firm’s investment project equals the sum of operating profits and proceeds from the sale of
depreciated capital,
Rktω
j
t−1K
j
t−1 + (1− δ)QKt ω
j
t−1K
j
t−1. (4)
Since capital is financed entirely by equity, the cash flow in (4) is paid off entirely to the lending
bank.
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2.3 Banks
On each island there exists a representative bank. Only the bank on island j has the technology to
obtain perfect information about firms on that island, monitor them, and enforce their contractual
obligations.9 This effectively precludes firms from obtaining funding from other sources, including
households or other banks. As indicated before, banks finance firms’ investment in the form of
perfectly state-contingent debt, Ajt . After production in period t+1, island j’s firm pays the bank
the entire cash flow from the investment project,

Rkt+1 + (1− δ)QKt+1

ωjtA
j
t =
Rkt+1 + (1− δ)QKt+1
QKt
ωjtQ
K
t A
j
t .
The gross return on the bank’s investment in real assets (QKt A
j
t) is thus the product of an aggregate
component,
RAt+1 ≡
Rkt+1 + (1− δ)QKt+1
QKt
,
and an island-specific component, ωjt . Besides investing in the local firm, the bank may borrow
or lend funds in the interbank market by means of one-period nominal loans. Let B+,jt and B
−,j
t
denote the real amount borrowed and lent at time t, respectively, with B+,jt , B
−,j
t ≥ 0. For each
unit lent in the interbank market at t the bank receives a noncontingent gross nominal return RLt at
period t+1, whereas each unit borrowed costs the bank the noncontingent gross nominal rate RBt
at t+ 1. Both rates are taken as given by the bank. Later we will see how they are determined.10
As of now it suffices to know that in equilibrium RBt ≥ RLt .
The bank can also purchase nominal long-term Treasury bonds. In particular, we assume that
a new bond issued at time t pays ζ(1 − ζ)s units of currency s + 1 periods later, for s ≥ 0.11 A
convenient feature of this specification is that a bond issued s periods ago is equivalent to (1− ζ)s
new bonds, so in each period we need only keep track of the price of one bond cohort. Let QGt
denote the nominal price of a bond issued at time t. Hence, the nominal return at the beginning
of period t+ 1 on the bank’s portfolio of government bonds is
RGt+1 ≡
ζ + (1− ζ)QGt+1
QGt
. (5)
We denote by bj,Gt the real market value of the bank’s government bond portfolio at the end of
period t. Finally, the bank takes a real amount Djt of deposits from the household, which as
9The costs of these activities for the bank are assumed to be negligible.
10In particular, they will both be a function of the monetary policy rates and the actual interbank market rate.
11Ever since Woodford (2001), this form of bond with geometrically decaying coupons has become a standard
way of modelling long-term nominal government debt in a tractable manner.
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mentioned before pay a gross nominal return RDt . Combining all these elements, the bank’s real
net earnings at the start of the following period, denoted by Ejt+1, will be given by
Ejt+1 = R
A
t+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j
t +
RLt
1 + πt+1
B−,jt +
RGt+1
1 + πt+1
bj,Gt −
RDt
1 + πt+1
Djt −
RBt
1 + πt+1
B+,jt . (6)
In each period t the sequence of events is as follows. The bank starts the period with net earnings
Ejt . We assume that the bank pays a fraction 1−ς ∈ (0, 1) of its earnings to households as dividends.
The remaining fraction ς is retained as post-dividend equity, denoted by N jt = ςE
j
t .
12 Following
the dividend payment, but before learning the shock to the local firm’s capital productivity in the
next period (ωjt), the bank takes deposits D
j
t from households. The deposits market then closes,
after which the island-specific shock ωjt is realized. Upon observing it, the bank then chooses how
much to invest in the local firm (QKt A
j
t) and in government bonds (b
j,G
t ), and how much to borrow
or lend in the interbank market (B+,jt , B
−,j
t ), subject to its balance sheet constraint,
QKt A
j
t +B
−,j
t + b
j,G
t = N
j
t +D
j
t +B
+,j
t . (7)
Finally, banks face an exogenous leverage constraint,
QKt A
j
t ≤ φN jt , (8)
with φ > 1;13 and they can not shortsell assets (Ajt , B
+,j
t , b
j,G
t ≥ 0) or lend negative amounts
(B−,jt ≥ 0).
The bank maximizes the expected discounted stream of dividends, Et
∞
t=1 Λt,t+s(1 − ς)E
j
t+s.
The problem can be expressed recursively as a two-stage problem within each period, whereby the
bank first chooses deposits and then, after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, chooses the
remaining balance-sheet items,
Vt(N
j
t ) = max
Djt≥0

V¯t(N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω)dF (ω),
V¯t(N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = max
Ajt≥0,b
j,G
t ≥0,B
+,j
t ≥0,B
−,j
t ≥0
EtΛt+1

(1− ς)Ejt+1 + Vt+1(ςE
j
t+1)

,
12In equilibrium, this specification is equivalent to assuming that banks do not pay dividends but each period a
constant fraction 1− ς of randomly selected banks close for exogenous reasons and pay their accumulated net worth
to the household as dividends. For models using specifications similar to the latter, see e.g. Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Nuño and Thomas (2017).
13We are assuming that government bonds or interbank lending do not enter the leverage constraint in equation
(8). This is completely inconsequential. As we show below, in equilibrium the banks for which the leverage constraint
binds choose not to invest in bonds or interbank loans. Conversely, the leverage constraint is slack for those banks
which choose to invest in bonds or interbank loans.
subject to equations (6), (7) and (8).
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Next we assume an implicit restriction on parameters, which ensures that in equilibrium the
interbank market will be active:
Assumption 1: We assume that parameters are such that the following inequality holds in
equilibrium for all t: Dt ≤ (φ− 1)Nt.
This condition simplifies the solution of the banks problem, since it avoids additional case
distinctions. In our numerical exercises we make sure it is satisfied.14 Given this assumption, the
solution of the bank’s problem is given by the following lemma (proved in Appendix A.1):
Lemma 1 (Bank’s problem) The solution to the bank’s problem is given by a demand policy
for the local firm’s assets,
Ajt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
φN jt /Q
K
t , if ω
j
t > ω
B
t ,
(N jt +D
j
t )/Q
K
t , if ω
L
t ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt ,
0, if ωjt < ω
L
t ,
(9)
and for interbank borrowing,
B+,jt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(φ− 1)N jt −Djt , if ωjt > ωBt ,
0, if ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt ,
0, if ωjt < ω
L
t .
(10)
where
ωBt ≡
Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
B
t / (1 + πt+1)

Et

Λ˜t,t+1RAt+1
 , ωLt ≡
Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
L
t / (1 + πt+1)

Et

Λ˜t,t+1RAt+1
 , (11)
14Allowing this condition to be violated would introduce a discontinuity in the solution of the model: If the
government engages in large enough asset purchases, it eventually may bring the interbank market to collaps as
borrowing orders reach 0. Additional purchases then have no more effect on the model. The solution of the
banks problem for the general case is available upon request. Notwithstanding, for our calibration quantitatively
it does not matter much whether or not we explicitly account for this satiation point. Even while assumption 1
holds, the marginal effect of asset purchases converges towards zero asymptotically (see Section 3 below). For our
calibration this convergence is rather fast: The marginal effect of asset purchases is already very close to 0 long
before assumption 1 may be violated.
Λ˜t,t+1 ≡ Λt,t+1

1− ς + ςλNt+1

and λNt is the marginal value of equity. Demand for government
bonds and interbank lending satisfies
bj,Gt = B
−,j
t = 0, if ω
j
t ≥ ωLt ,
bj,Gt +B
−,j
t = N
j
t +D
j
t , (b
j,G
t , B
−,j
t ) ≥ 0, if ωjt < ωLt .
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Banks individual deposit demand satisfies:
Djt ∈ [0, (φ− 1)N jt ].
The ex-ante return on government bonds and the return on interbank lending satisfy a no-arbitrage
condition, 

G
 

L

15Notice that for these banks the demand for government bonds bj,Gt versus interbank lending B
−,j
t is undeter-
mined at the individual level, as both assets are equally profitable ex ante. However, it will be determined at the
aggregate level as explained later on.
Finally, the nominal deposit rate equals
RDt =

1− F

ωBt

RBt + F

ωLt

RLt
+

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt
 E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
A
t+1

Et

Λ˜t,t+1/ (1 + πt+1)
 , (13)
with RDt ∈ [RLt , RBt ].
The lemma states that, according to their island-specific return realization ωjt , banks endoge-
nously split into the following three groups, illustrated in figure 2:
• On islands where the local firm draws an idiosyncratic shock above the borrowing threshold
ωBt , the local bank borrows from the interbank market so as to invest in the firm up to the
leverage constraint.
• Banks that draw an idiosyncratic return below the lending threshold ωLt lend their resources
(equity and deposits) in the interbank market and to the government, with both investments
offering the same ex ante return according to equation (12).15
• Finally, banks with an idiosyncratic return in between both thresholds do not borrow or lend
in the interbank market and simply invest their equity and deposits in the local firm.
This implies that the leverage constraint is always binding for the more productive banks, while
it is slack for the less productive ones.
Notice also that, according to equation (13), the unit cost of taking deposits at the beginning
of the period — i.e. the deposit rate — equals the expected benefit across realizations of ωjt . For
high-profitability banks (ωjt > ω
B
t ) that are leverage-constrained, an additional unit of deposits
allows them to reduce their interbank borrowing, thus saving R
B
t
1+πt+1
. For low-profitability banks
Et


Λ˜t,t+1
RGt+1
1 + πt+1

= Et


Λ˜t,t+1
RLt
1 + πt+1

. (12)
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Figure 2: This figure illustrates how banks split into 3 groups according to the return on their
island (x-axis). For simplicity we abstract from aggregate uncertainty in this graph.
16Since the bank’s problem is locally linear in deposits Djt , the banks optimality conditions do not pin down the
individual amount of deposit taking but instead the equilibrium deposit rate: By equation (13) in equilibrium the
bank breaks even ex ante, so it is indifferent between taking one more unit of deposits or not. The only requirement
is that all banks satisfy 0 ≤ Djt ≤ (φ− 1)N
j
t .
(ωjt < ω
L
t ), each additional unit of deposits is invested in interbank lending or government bonds,
which yields R
L
t
1+πt+1
. For intermediate-profitability banks (ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt ), each additional unit of
deposits is invested in the local firm, with an average idiosyncratic return of E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

.16
2.4 The interbank market
The interbank market is modelled as a decentralized, over-the-counter (OTC) market, as in Afonso
and Lagos (2012), Armenter and Lester (2017), or Bianchi and Bigio (2017), among many others.
Banks that wish to lend place lending orders, whereas banks that wish to borrow place borrowing
orders. Lending and borrowing orders are placed on a per-unit basis, as in Atkeson et al. (2012).
Borrowing and lending orders then search for each other in an interbank market characterized by
search and matching frictions.
We start by determining the volume of borrowing and lending orders. We know from Lemma
1 that banks with ωjt > ω
B
t borrow from other banks in the amount B
+,j
t = (φ− 1)N jt −Djt ≥ 0,
whereas those with ωjt < ω
L
t lend to other banks in the amount B
−,j
t = (N
j
t +D
j
t )− bj,Gt ≥ 0. The
mass of borrowing and lending orders are thus given respectively by
ΦBt ≡
 1
0
B+,jt dj =

j:ωjt>ω
B
t

(φ− 1)N jt −Djt

dj =

1− F

ωBt

[(φ− 1)Nt −Dt] , (14)
ΦLt ≡
 1
0
B−,jt dj =

j:ωjt<ω
L
t

(N jt +D
j
t )− bj,Gt

dj = F

ωLt

(Nt +Dt)− bGt , (15)
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where Nt ≡
 1
0
N jt dj is aggregate bank equity, b
G
t ≡

j:ωjt<ω
L
t
bj,Gt dj are aggregate bank holdings of
government bonds, and in each equality with have used the fact that ωjt is distributed independently
from N jt and D
j
t .
Following Armenter and Lester (2017), we assume competitive search in the interbank market.17
Our motivation for assuming competitive search is that, as will become clear shortly, it delivers a
natural explanation for the observed relationship between excess reserves and the spread between
their return and that of short-term interbank claims. The interbank market is divided into many
different ’submarkets’. Each submarket is a subset of borrowers and lenders searching for each
other. Submarkets differ in the loan rate that is offered to both sides, denoted byRIBs,t for submarket
s. In each submarket, lending (ΦLs,t) and borrowing orders (Φ
B
s,t) are matched according to a
common matching function, Υ

ΦLs,t,Φ
B
s,t

. We assume that Υ is C1, weakly increasing and concave
in both arguments, naturally satisfies 0 ≤ Υ (x, y) ≤ min (x, y) and has constant returns to scale.
Given constant returns to scale, each lending order finds a borrowing order with probability
Υ

ΦLs,t,Φ
B
s,t

ΦLs,t
= Υ

1,
ΦBs,t
ΦLs,t

≡ ΓL

ΦBs,t
ΦLs,t

, (16)
in which case it earns the interest rate RIBs,t ; otherwise the unit of funds is deposited at the central
bank and earns the deposit facility rate, RDFt . Similarly, each borrowing order finds a lending order
with probability
Υ

ΦLs,t,Φ
B
s,t

ΦBs,t
= Υ


1
ΦBs,t/Φ
L
s,t
, 1

≡ ΓB

ΦBs,t
ΦLs,t

, (17)
in which case it pays the interest rate RIBs,t ; otherwise the unit of funds must be borrowed from
the central bank at the lending facility rate, RLFt , with R
LF
t > R
DF
t . Let θs,t ≡ ΦBs,t/ΦLs,t denote
the ratio of borrowing to lending orders in submarket s, which we henceforth refer to as interbank
(sub)market tightness. Thus, the matching probability for lending (borrowing) orders ΓL (ΓB) is
increasing (decreasing) in market tightness.
Both borrowers and lenders send their respective orders to the submarkets that maximize their
respective values. As shown in Appendix A.2, value maximization with respect to the choice of
interbank submarket is equivalent, in the case of lending banks, to maximizing the average return
on lending orders,
ΓL (θs,t)R
IB
s,t +

1− ΓL (θs,t)

RDFt ≡ RLs,t, (18)
In the case of borrowing banks, the same maximization is equivalent to minimizing the average
17The concept of competitive search equilibrium has a long tradition in search theory, starting with the seminal
contribution of Moen (1997). See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
cost of borrowing orders,
ΓB (θs,t)R
IB
s,t +

1− ΓB (θs,t)

RLFt ≡ RBs,t. (19)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
LetRLt denote the maximum average return that a lender can obtain in equilibrium. Any submarket
that attracts lenders must therefore offer them the average return RLt . In other words, the pair
RIBs,t , θs,t

in any submarket that is active in equilibrium must satisfy RLs,t = R
L
t , or
ΓL (θs,t)R
IB
s,t +

1− ΓL (θs,t)

RDFt = R
L
t . (20)
Therefore, in order to accept visiting a submarket that offers a lower rate RIBs,t , lenders must be
compensated by a higher market tightness θs,t and therefore a higher matching probability ΓL (θs,t).
Subject to (20), borrowers choose the submarket that minimizes their borrowing cost (19) with
respect to RIBs,t and θs,t.
18 As shown in Appendix A, the solution to this problem is given by the
following interbank rate.19
Proposition 1 (Interbank rate) The equilibrium interbank interest rate is given by
RIBt = ϕ (θt)R
DF
t + (1− ϕ (θt))RLFt , (21)
where
L

L B

B
18As argued by Armenter and Lester (2017), the competitive search paradigm captures salient features of trading
activity in interbank markets. Given the repeated interactions, lenders typically have ex ante information about
which borrowers pay higher or lower interest rates; moreover, those that offer higher rates typically attract more
lenders. Thus, competitive search captures the bilateral and stochastic nature of trading in interbank markets while
retaining the link between interest rates and allocations.
19In equilibrium, all banks visit the same submarket, characterized by the pair

RIBt , θt

that satisfies equation
(21) and θt = ΦBt /ΦLt , with the aggregate amount of borrowing and lending orders, ΦBt and ΦLt , being determined
by equations (14) and (15). Given the equilibrium pair

RIBs,t , θs,t

=

RIBt , θt

, lenders’ and borrowers’ average
return, RLt and R
B
t , simply equal the left-hand side of equations (20) and (19), respectively.
The equilibrium interest rate for matched orders is a weighted average of the respective outside
return/cost: the deposit facility rate RDFt for lenders and the lending facility rate R
LF
t for borrow-
ers, with the weight on the former given by the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
the number of borrowing orders, ϕ (θt). Therefore, when the elasticity ϕ (θt) is high, the interbank
rate paid by borrowers and earned by lenders is close to the floor of the interest rate corridor. In
this regard, ϕ (θt) can be interpreted as the borrowers’ share of the joint surplus, defined as the
gap between both policy rates.
While the sign of ϕ (θt) depends on the assumed matching technology, it is natural to consider
technologies for which ϕ, and hence borrowers’ surplus share, decreases with the tightness of the
ϕ (θt) ≡
dΓL (θt)
dθ
θt
ΓL (θt)
=
∂Υ

ΦLt ,Φ
B
t

∂ΦBt
ΦBt
Υ (ΦLt ,Φ
B
t )
∈ (0, 1). (22)
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interbank market. We shall maintain this assumption from now on. Intuitively, when the ratio
between borrowing and lending orders increases, it becomes harder for borrowers to find lenders, so
the former must offer rates that are higher and hence closer to the lending facility rate. Conversely,
in a slack interbank market with a relative abundance of lending orders, lenders must accept rates
that are lower and hence closer to the deposit facility rate.
As indicated above, our assumption of competitive search is motivated by our interest in pro-
viding a natural and simple explanation for the downward-sloping relationship between excess
reserves and the spread between the interbank rate and the deposit facility rate (DFR) observed
in the euro area and other major advanced economies. Indeed, from equation (21) the foregone
return from funds deposited at the central bank is given by
RIBt −RDFt = (1− ϕ (θt))

RLFt −RDFt

.
As we prove in the next section, in our model there exists an inverse relationship between the
amount of excess reserves and interbank market tightness. Thus, an economy with large excess
reserves is characterized by a slack interbank market, i.e. by a low θt. Provided ϕ < 0, an
increase in excess reserves therefore narrows the gap RIBt − RDFt (for a given width of the policy
rate corridor, RLFt − RDFt ). In search-theoretic environments an alternative (and relatively more
common) approach is to assume random search, instead of competitive search. However, standard
formulations of that approach would not deliver the above endogenous relationship between the
amount of reserves and the interbank-DFR spread.20
Such inverse relationship between the amount of reserves and the spread between their return
and that of short-term interbank rates is common in the literature on reserves. In much of that
literature, banks hold reserves in order to self-insure against liquidity shocks (as in the classic Poole,
1968, analysis or, more recently, Bianchi and Bigio, 2017) or because it constitutes an essential
input to their activities (see Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011, and Ireland, 2014, for recent examples).
Instead, in our model banks with relatively poor investment opportunities simply try to pass their
reserves on to other banks and earn a higher return along the way; but, as in Afonso and Lagos
(2012) and other studies in the search-theoretical literature, search and matching frictions in the
interbank market imply that some banks nevertheless end up holding reserves at the end of the
period. In reality, both explanations are likely to coexist, that is, banks may wish to hold some
reserves because of the liquidity services they provide, but also because frictions in the interbank
20In a standard random search setup, each matched borrower-lender pair would negotiate the interbank loan
rate à la Nash according to an exogenous bargaining power parameter, ϕ¯. The agreed rate would be given by
equation (21) with ϕ¯ replacing ϕ (θt). The opportunity cost of reserves would then be (1− ϕ¯)

RLFt −RDFt

, which
is independent of interbank market tightness for a given corridor width. Nonetheless, Bianchi and Bigio (2017)
show that, by extending the standard random search setup (with a single search round) to a multiround search
environment, one can arrive to similar results, albeit at the cost of additional complexity.
market prevent them from finding suitable borrowers.
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2.5 Final good producers
A competitive representative final good producer aggregates a continuum of differentiated retail
goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology, Yt =
 1
0
Y
(−1)/
i,t di
	/(−1)
, where
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across retail goods. Cost minimization implies
Yi,t =


Pi,t
Pt
−
Yt ≡ Y dt (Pi,t) , (23)
where Pt =
 1
0
P 1−i,t di
	1/(1−)
is a price index. Total spending in intermediate inputs then equals
 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi = PtYt. Free entry implies zero profits, such that the equilibrium price of the final
good is exactly Pt.
2.6 Retail goods producers
We assume that the monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level. Retailers purchase units of
the intermediate good firms, transform them one-for-one into retail good varieties, and sell these
to final good producers. Each retailer i sets a price Pi,t as in the sticky price model of Calvo
(1983) taking as given the demand curve Y dt (Pi,t) and the price of the intermediate good, P
y
t .
Specifically, during each period a fraction of firms (1− θ) are allowed to change prices, whereas
the other fraction, θ, do not change. Retailers that are able to change prices in period t choose a
new optimal price in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of profits,
max
Pi,t
∞
k=0
θkEt

Λt,t+k


Pi,t
Pt+k
−MCt+k


Pi,t
Pt+k
−
Yt+k

. (24)
The first-order condition is standard, with all time-t price-setters choosing a common price P ∗t ; see
Appendix B. The price level Pt evolves according to P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ) (P ∗t )
1−.
2.7 Central Bank
Interest rate policy. The central bank sets two nominal policy rates: the (gross) deposit facility
rate RDFt and the (gross) lending facility rate R
LF
t . We assume that the policy rates are set such
that: (i) a constant corridor of width χ > 0 is maintained, i.e.
RLFt = R
DF
t + χ, (25)
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and (ii) the central bank’s operational target, which we assume to be the interbank rate, achieves
a certain target level.21 This target level is described by a conventional Taylor rule,
RIB,∗t = ρR
IB
t−1 + (1− ρ)

R¯ss + υπt

, (26)
where R¯ss is the steady-state nominal interbank rate, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence parameter, and
υ > 1 determines the response to deviations in net inflation from target (assumed to be zero).
Combining equation (21) and (25), we obtain the following relationship between the operational
target and the deposit facility rate: RIBt = R
DF
t + (1− ϕt)χ, where ϕt ≡ ϕ (θt). Using this and
the Taylor rule (26), we can then find the deposit facility rate that implements the desired level
for the operational target,
RDF,∗t = ρ

RDFt−1 +

1− ϕt−1

χ

+ (1− ρ)

R¯ + υπt

− (1− ϕt)χ. (27)
As mentioned before, all gross nominal rates have an ELB given by 1 − κ ≤ 1. Thus, if RDF,∗t is
above such ELB, then RDFt = R
DF,∗
t and R
IB
t = R
IB∗
t . But if R
DF,∗
t falls below the ELB, then
RDFt = 1− κ and the central bank must accept a positive deviation of the interbank rate from its
target. Therefore, the deposit facility rate equals
RDFt = max
 
RDF,∗t , 1− κ
!
.
with given by (27).
Market rates and the interest rate corridor. It is worthwhile to pause for a moment
to take stock of the different market interest rates in our model and where they lie relative to
each other inside the interest rate corridor formed by the two policy rates. According to (21), the
interbank rate RIBt is a weighted average of the two policy rates (R
DF
t , R
LF
t ), being closer to the
floor the higher the borrowers’ surplus share ϕ (θt). The effective returns on interbank lending and
borrowing are given, respectively, by
RLt = Γ
L (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓL (θt)

RDFt , (28)
RBt = Γ
B (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓB (θt)

RLFt , (29)
i.e. they are weighted averages of the interbank rate and the respective outside-option return
(RDFt , R
LF
t ), with weights that depend on the respective matching probabilities, Γ
L (θt) ≡ ΓLt and
21Targeting an index of interbank market rates is common among major central banks — e.g. the Federal Funds
Rate in the US. We could have alternatively chosen the household discount rate RDt as the central bank’s operating
target. Our results would have been very similar, because in equilibrium both rates are very close to each other,
regardless of the size of the central bank’s balance sheet.
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ΓB (θt) ≡ ΓBt . Finally, from Lemma 1 the deposit rate lies in between the effective interbank
lending and borrowing rates, RDt ∈ [RLt , RBt ]; its position relative to RIBt is in principle ambiguous.
Taking all this together, we have the following equilibrium ordering:
Lemma 2 Market (RLt , R
IB
t , R
D
t , R
B
t ) and policy (R
DF
t , R
LF
t ) nominal rates satisfy
RDFt ≤ RLt ≤ RIBt , RDt ≤ RBt ≤ RLFt .
Much of our theoretical analysis in the next sections will be devoted to analyzing how market
rates move inside the interest rate corridor (RDFt , R
LF
t ) as the size of the central bank’s balance
sheet changes. We turn next precisely to balance-sheet policy.
Balance sheet policy. The central bank also chooses the real market value of its government
bond holdings, bG,CBt . We assume the latter is determined by the following rule,
bG,CBt = (1− ζ) bG,CBt−1 + ζb
G,CB
+ npt + ζ(b
G,CB
t−1 − b
G,CB
)rit, (30)
where npt and rit ∈ {0, 1} are extraordinary real net purchases and extraordinary real reinvestment,
which are generally zero. This rule says that, in the absence of extraordinary measures, the central
bank keeps the real market value of its bond portfolio fixed at b
G,CB
. The real net purchases give
the central bank a tool to increase the balance sheet size in extraordinary times, while reinvestment
allows the central bank to keep the balanced sheet size fixed for a while after net purchases have
been phased out.
The central bank’s assets are government bonds, bG,CBt , and loans to banks extended by its
lending facility, i.e. the mass of borrowing orders that did not find matches in the interbank
market: ΦBt

1− ΓBt

. Its liabilities are banks’ reserves at its deposit facility, i.e. the mass of
interbank lending orders that did not find a match: ΦLt

1− ΓLt

.22 We assume that the central
bank accumulates no equity and pays all profits to the government.23 The central bank’s balance
sheet, expressed in real terms, is therefore
bG,CBt + Φ
B
t

1− ΓBt

= ΦLt

1− ΓLt

. (31)
Finally, the central bank’s real profits are
ΠCBt =
RGt
1 + πt
bG,CBt−1 +
RLFt−1
1 + πt
ΦBt−1

1− ΓBt−1

−
RDFt−1
1 + πt
ΦLt−1

1− ΓLt−1

.
22The monetary base is therefore the nominal amount of reserves at the central bank, PtΦLt

1− ΓLt

. For
convenience, we abstract from cash holdings by banks and households, although nothing of substance for our key
insights would change if we allowed for such holdings.
23In case of central bank losses, these are assumed to be covered by the Treasury.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
2.8 Government
The budget constraint of the government expressed in real terms is given by
bt−1
RGt
1 + πt
= bt + Tt + Π
CB
t ,
where bt is the real market value of government debt.24 Without loss of generality, the latter is
assumed to be held constant at a certain level: bt = b.
2.9 Aggregation, market clearing and equilibrium
Market clearing for capital requires that total supply by households, Kt, equals total demand by
intermediate firms,
 1
0
Kjt dj. Since K
j
t = A
j
t on each island j the capital stock Kt equals total
demand of firms’ assets by banks,
 1
0
Ajtdj. To calculate the latter, we use Lemma 1, obtaining
Kt =

j:ωjt>ω
B
t
φN jt
QKt
dj+

j:ωjt∈[ωLt ,ωBt ]
N jt +D
j
t
QKt
dj =
φ

1− F

ωBt

Nt +

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

(Nt +Dt)
QKt
,
(32)
where in the second equality we have used the fact that ωjt is independently distributed from N
j
t
and Djt .
Labor market clearing requires that household’s labor supply Lt equals firms’ total labor de-
mand,
 1
0
Ljtdj. To calculate the latter, we start by using (3) to solve for individual labor demand
Ljt and we then aggregate across firms:
 1
0
Ljtdj =

(1−α)ZtMCt
Wt
	1/α  1
0
ωjt−1K
j
t−1dj. To solve for 1
0
ωjt−1K
j
t−1dj, we use again Lemma 1 and K
j
t = A
j
t to obtain
24The government’s real budget constraint can be derived from the nominal budget constraint: ζBt−1 =
B
new
t Q
G
t + Pt

Tt +ΠCBt

, where B
new
t = Bt − (1 − ζ)Bt−1 is gross new bond issuance, using also the defini-
tion of RGt (equation 5) and b¯t ≡ BtQGt /Pt.
 1
0
ωjtK
j
t dj =
φNt
QKt

ωBt
ωdF (ω) +
Nt +Dt
QKt
 ωBt
ωLt
ωdF (ω)
=
φNt
QKt

1− F

ωBt

E

ω | ω ≥ ωBt

+
Nt +Dt
QKt

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω < ωBt

,
where we have used again the fact that ωjt is independently distributed from N
j
t , D
j
t . Using (32),
we can express the above equation more compactly as
 1
0
ωjtK
j
t dj = ΩtKt, (33)
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where
Ωt ≡
φ

1− F

ωBt

E

ω | ω ≥ ωBt

φ [1− F (ωBt )] + Nt+DtNt [F (ω
B
t )− F (ωLt )]
+
Nt+Dt
Nt

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω < ωBt

φ [1− F (ωBt )] + Nt+DtNt [F (ω
B
t )− F (ωLt )]
(34)
is an index of capital efficiency.25 Labor market clearing then requires
Lt =


(1− α)ZtMCt
Wt
1/α
Ωt−1Kt−1. (35)
Aggregate supply of the intermediate good equals
 1
0
Y jt dj. Equations (3) and (35) imply that the
effective capital-labor ratio ωjt−1K
j
t−1/L
j
t equals Ωt−1Kt−1/Lt for all firms. From equation (2), we
then have
 1
0
Y jt dj = Zt


Lt
Ωt−1Kt−1
1−α  1
0
ωjt−1K
j
t−1dj = ZtL
1−α
t (Ωt−1Kt−1)
α ,
where in the second equality we have used (33). Using (23), aggregate demand of the intermediate
good equals
 1
0
Yi,tdi = Yt
 1
0

Pi,t
Pt
	−
di = YtΔt, where Δt ≡
 1
0
(Pi,t/Pt)
− di is an index of relative
price dispersion. Market clearing for the intermediate good therefore requires
Yt =
Zt
Δt
L1−αt (Ωt−1Kt−1)
α .
Aggregate supply of the final good must equal consumption and investment demand by households,
Yt = Ct + It.
Market clearing for government bonds requires supply to equal demand by private banks and the
central bank,26
bt = b
G
t + b
G,CB
t .
25In the limiting case in which ωBt−1 = ω
L
t−1 ≡ ω¯t−1, Ωt collapses to E (ω | ω ≥ ω¯t−1).
26Notice that we have implicitly assumed that the household cannot hold government bonds. This assumption is
innocuous, since in equilibrium the household will always prefer deposits over bonds.
Nt
ς
= RAt Ωt−1Q
K
t−1Kt−1 +
RLt−1
1 + πt
ΦLt−1 +
RGt
1 + πt
bGt−1 −
RDt−1
1 + πt
Dt−1 −
RBt−1
1 + πt
ΦBt−1,
where we have used (33) and Ajt−1 = K
j
t−1 to substitute for
 1
0
ωjt−1A
j
t−1dj (= Ωt−1Kt−1).
Finally, we can aggregate equation (6) across banks and use N it = ςE
j
t to find an expression for
aggregate bank equity,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
This concludes the set-up of the model. We define an equilibrium in this model as a set of
state-contingent functions for prices and quantities such that all agents’ optimization problems are
solved and markets clear. Appendix B.1 lists the conditions that have to hold in equilibrium for
aggregate variables.
3 The interbank transmission channel of bond purchases
Having set up the model, we now discuss the mechanism through which the central bank’s balance
sheet policy affects interest rates and, through these, the rest of the economy. We focus our
discussion here on asset purchases; however the last section of the paper shows that our arguments
apply to credit operations with banks as well.
For this and for the next section it is useful to define two further properties that the matching
function may fulfill:
Definition 1 (Match-efficient interbank market) The interbank market is match-efficient
if Υ (x, x) = x. If Υ (x, x) < x, then it is match-inefficient. The interbank market is asymptoti-
cally match-efficient if lim
x→∞
Υ (x, y) = lim
x→∞
Υ (y, x) = y.
This definition states that the interbank market is match-efficient if, whenever the number
of lending and borrowing orders is the same, all orders find a match (since then both matching
probabilities equal Υ (x, x) /x = 1). If in such situations some orders do not find a match, then
the interbank market is said to be match-inefficient. Asymptotic match-efficiency means that, if
the volume of orders on one of the two sides of the market is arbitrarily large, then the number of
matches equals the volume of orders on the short side. Notice that, as the matching function is
increasing, match efficiency necessarily implies asymptotic match efficiency.
The (capped) Cobb-Douglas function, Υ (x, y) = min{λ2xλ1y1−λ1 , x, y}, with λ2 ∈ (0, 1) and
λ1 ∈ (0, 1),27 is match-inefficient, although it is still asymptotically match-efficient.28 Similarly,
the functional form proposed by Den Haan et al. (2000), Υ (x, y) = xy

xλ + yλ
−1/λ
is match-
inefficient but asymptotically match-efficient. In the limit λ→∞, this function becomes equivalent
to the Leontieff function Υ (x, y) = min {x, y}, which is the only continuous and weakly increasing
matching technology that satisfies match-efficiency.29
27In discrete time environments, matching functions need to respect the requirement that matching probabilities
do not exceed unity — i.e. there cannot be more matches than searchers on either side. The Cobb-Douglas specifi-
cation generally does not satisfy this requirement, hence its capping. If λ2 ≥ 1 the capped Cobb-Douglas function
is equal to the Leontieff function.
28For λ2 < 1, Υ (x, x) = min{λ2x, x, x} = λ2x < x, hence the match-inefficiency. However, lim
x→∞
Υ (x, y) =
min{∞,∞, y} = y, hence the asymptotic match-efficiency.
29Proof available upon request. However, in violation of our assumption that Υ is C1, this function is not
continuously differentiable. Therefore, in the following whenever we speak of a match-efficient technology we refer
to the following limiting case: limλ→λΥ(x, y;λ), where Υ(x, y;λ) is a continuous non-match-efficient matching
function parametrized by λ satisfying limλ→λΥ(x, y;λ) = min {x, y} ∀x, y.G C G C
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Having defined these concepts, we now analyze the transmission of asset purchases. Combining
the balance sheet constraint (31) and the interbank market clearing condition ΓBt Φ
B
t = Γ
L
t Φ
L
t yields
ΦLt − ΦBt = b
G,CB
t . (36)
That is, the difference between lending and borrowing orders in the interbank market equals the
market value of bonds held by the central bank. Dividing by ΦBt , rearranging, and using the
definition of interbank market tightness, θt = ΦBt /Φ
L
t , we obtain
λ λ
30The central bank controls the ratio bG,CBt ≡ bG,CBt /ΦBt indirectly, by directly choosing the nominal value of
bonds held bG,CBt Pt. To be able to exercise this control, it must be (i) that prices do not simply adjust such that
the real holdings bG,CBt stay constant and (ii) that the volume of borrowing orders does not adjust such that the
ratio bG,CBt /ΦBt stays constant. The former is guaranteed by price stickiness — in a model without nominal rigidities
by contrast, there exists an equilibrium where the central bank’s nominal asset holdings have no influence on real
variables. Whether the latter holds true is determined in general equilibrium. Figure 9 in Appendix 3 shows a
numerical example how nominal purchases translate into changes of bG,CBt /ΦBt almost proportionally, since neither
Pt nor ΦBt respond significantly.
θ−1t = bG,CBt + 1 (37)
where bG,CBt ≡ bG,CBt /ΦBt denotes central bank bond holdings normalized by the value of interbank
borrowing orders. Therefore, by increasing its bond holdings, the central bank can (for given ΦBt )
reduce the tightness in the interbank market.30 This in turn affects borrowers’ surplus share ϕ (θt),
the matching probabilities (Γx (θt) , x = L,B), and ultimately, through equations (21), (28) and
(29), the position of market rates inside the corridor. The following proposition characterizes how
asset purchases affect market interest rates:
Proposition 2 (Effect of central bank bond purchases) (i) Government bond purchases by
the central bank bG,CBt push the interbank rate RIBt and with it the effective borrowing and lending
rates RBt and R
L
t towards the bottom of the corridor:
∂RIBt −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
,
∂RBt −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
,
∂RLt −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
< 0. (38)
(ii) Bond purchases feature a weak form of decreasing returns to scale of bond purchases, defined as
follows. Let Θt

bG,CBt
	
≡

RIBt (0)−RDFt (0)

−

RIBt

bG,CBt
	
−RDFt

bG,CBt
		
be the reduction
in the interbank rate due to bond purchases, relative to the case of no bond purchases. Then
Θt

xbG,CBt
	
< Θt

bG,CBt
	
x ∀x > x, for some x ≥ 1.
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Figure 3: This figure schematically represents the transmission of monetary policy to market rates.
It shows how the rates respond to a parallel shift in the policy rates (panel 1) or an expansion of
the balance sheet (panel 2). Note that the model predicts no particular ordering of RD and RIB.
The case depicted here with RD > RIB is purely illustrative.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. According to part (i), bond purchases monotonically
reduce the spread between the actual interbank rate (as well as the effective interbank borrowing
and lending rates) and the deposit facility rate. The previously derived negative effect of bond
purchases on interbank market tightness, together with of our assumption that ϕ(θt) < 0, are key
in driving this result.
Another way to understand this result is as follows. Given a fixed supply of government bonds,
larger holdings by the central bank imply smaller holdings by commercial banks, bGt . From equation
(15), ceteris paribus this increases the amount of funds that banks with relatively poor investment
opportunities try to place in the interbank market. This increase in lending orders ΦLt reduces
the tightness in the interbank market (θt falls) for a given volume of borrowing orders ΦBt . Under
competitive search — and the assumption that ϕ (θt) < 0 — this implies a higher surplus share
for borrowers and, from equation (21), a lower interbank market rate for given policy rates. In
addition, the fall in interbank market tightness makes it harder for lenders to find borrowers and
easier for borrowers to find lenders (ΓLt decreases, Γ
B
t increases). From equations (28, 29), it follows
that RLt and R
B
t fall too. Panel 2 in Figure 3 illustrates these effects.
The effect of balance sheet policies on RLt and R
B
t is passed through to the household deposit
rate according to equation (13). Since RDt depends also on other variables that are determined
in general equilibrium, Proposition 2 cannot generally be extended to RDt . However, as we will
see in our numerical analysis, for our calibration RDt is always indistinguishable from R
IB
t and
hence moves essentially one for one with the latter. The reduction in the nominal deposit rate
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in turn triggers a general equilibrium response similar to that triggered by a policy rate cut in
the standard New Keynesian model: Since prices are sticky, real rates fall and households bring
forward consumption, which stimulates the economy.31
Part (ii) of the proposition follows from (38) and the fact that by Lemma 2 RIBt ≥ RDFt .32
Since bond purchases monotonically reduce the interbank-DFR spread but the latter is always
non-negative, for a given bond purchase program of size b˜G,CBt (starting from zero holdings) there
exists a minimum scaling factor x ≥ 1 such that a proportional increase in the size of the program
by any factor x ≥ x reduces the above spread by a less than proportional amount.
In addition to market interest rates, asset purchases also have implications for the quantity
of reserves. The larger volume of interbank lending orders ΦLt and the lower lender matching
probability ΓLt imply that more lending orders fail to find a match and hence end up at the central
banks reserve facility:

1− ΓLt

ΦLt increases. Our model therefore delivers an inverse relationship
between the interbank-reserves interest rate spread and the amount of excess reserves. How much
of the bond purchases actually translates into an increase in reserves depends on what happens
with the other asset in the central bank’s balance sheet: lending facility credit,

1− ΓBt

ΦBt . In the
special case of match-efficiency, since borrowing orders are the ’short side’ of the interbank, they all
are matched (ΓBt = 1). Therefore, there is no lending facility activity and bond purchases translates
one for one into reserves creation. In the more general case of match-inefficiency, some borrowing
orders fail to be matched (ΓBt < 1) and hence there is always some lending facility credit. In
this case, bond purchases and the resulting interbank market slackening raise borrowers’ matching
probability and

1− ΓBt

ΦBt falls (for given borrowing orders Φ
B
t ), such that bond purchases
crowd out some facility lending. As long as the interbank market is approximately match-efficient,
however, ΓBt is always close to one and the latter effect is negligible, so bond purchases increase
reserves almost one for one.33
Finally, we highlight that our model can also be used to understand the asymmetric corridor
system that the US Federal Reserve (the "Fed") operated until 2008 (as did many other central
banks). Back then, the Fed paid no interest on excess reserves: RDFt = 1 for all t. It also offered
31Our model features additional transmission channels of monetary policy that are not present in the standard
New Keynesian model. First, a change in interbank market tightness also affects the average capital efficiency Ωt
defined in equation (34). Second, nominal contracts imply redistributionary effects between households and banks,
which in turn affect the average capital efficiency as well. We abstract however from further discussion of these
additional effects here for convenience and because they turn out to be small for plausible calibrations.
32Note that decreasing returns to scale are conventionally defined as in the proposition but with x = 1.
33The timing adds some subtle details to these mechanisms. The central bank purchases assets before the
interbank market closes from banks that are on islands that had low productivity in the previous period, i.e.
those with ωjt−1 < ω
L
t−1. It pays in reserves. These banks instantaneously use these reserves to finance their
portfolio choices. After the interbank market closes, these reserves end up with the banks on islands that have low
productivity in the current period, i.e. those with ωjt < ω
L
t . Imagine for example: A particular bank j’s draw ω
j
t
is below ωLt both yesterday and today. Yesterday it bought bonds worth one unit today. Today it sells them to
the central bank in exchange for reserves before the interbank market closes. It uses these funds to lend them in
the interbank market. When the interbank market closes, ΓLt units of reserves have been lent to other banks and
(1− ΓLt ) remain on bank j’s balance sheet.
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funds target (RIBt ). Instead of steering the latter by moving both the upper and lower bound of
the corridor as in a standard corridor system, the Fed did so by moving only the discount rate and
fine-tuning its government bond holdings through open market operations. For example, to lower
the Fed funds rate the Fed would buy bonds and lower the discount rate. This is consistent with our
model. Lowering RLFt alone reduces R
IB
t , however less than one for one since the relative position
of RIBt within the corridor remains constant (for given tightness). An increase of government bond
holdings is hence necessary to lower RIBt further, up until it falls one-for-one with R
LF
t .
34
4 Large vs lean balance sheet
In this section we compare the properties of a “lean” central bank balance sheet regime, in which
the central bank holds no bonds, with those of a “large” balance sheet regime, in which the central
bank has permanently expanded its balance sheet size through an asset purchasing program.
4.1 Lean balance sheet
By lean balance sheet we refer to a scenario in which central bank asset holdings are arbitrarily
small. In particular, we consider for illustration the limiting case in which the central bank does
not hold any government bonds: bG,CBt = 0. In this case the central banks balance sheet has only
one item on each side: lending facility lending is the only asset and deposit facility borrowing
(reserves) the only liability. From equation (36), the volume of borrowing and lending orders must
then be the same, such that interbank market tightness equals θt = ΦBt /Φ
L
t = 1. The match
finding probabilities of borrowers and lenders hence equal
ΓLt = Γ
B
t = Υ (1, 1) . (39)
If in addition one assumes a match-efficient interbank market, in which the number of matches
always equals the ’short side’ of the market, both matching probabilities are one: ΓLt = Γ
B
t =
Υ (1, 1) = 1. Hence neither lending nor borrowing banks need to access the central bank’s deposit
or lending facilities, so reserves and facility lending are both zero: ΦLt

1− ΓLt

= ΦBt

1− ΓBt

= 0.
Therefore, under match-efficiency, a ’lean’ balance sheet is in fact a zero-sized balance sheet.
Combining (39) with equations (13), (21), (25) , (28) and ( 29) allows us to characterize the
relative position of equilibrium rates within the corridor formed by the policy rates:
34Two further details (unmodelled here) distinguish the US from the Euro Area. (i) Prior to 2002 the discount
rate was below the Fed funds rate. Banks did nevertheless not use the discount window much because lending was
rationed and stigmatized. (ii) Not all agents in the Fed funds market have access to the Fed’s deposit facility, which
is why the Fed funds rate lately traded marginally below the interest on excess reserves.
discount window loans at a discount rate (RLFt in our model) which was set 1ppt above the Fed
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Proposition 3 (Corridor system) If bG,CBt = 0, then
RIBt = ϕ (1)R
DF
t + (1− ϕ (1))RLFt ,
RBt = R
LF
t − χϕ(1)Υ (1, 1) ,
RLt = R
DF
t + χ [1− ϕ(1)]Υ (1, 1) ,
which implies RDFt < R
L
t < R
IB
t < R
B
t < R
LF
t . If the interbank market is furthermore match-
efficient, then Υ (1, 1) = 1 and
RDt = R
L
t = R
B
t = R
D
t = R
IB
t = ϕ (1)R
DF
t + (1− ϕ (1))RLFt .
The interbank rate thus equals a weighted average of the two policy rates with a constant weight
of ϕ (1). For instance, if the matching technology satisfies ϕ (1) = 1/2, such that its elasticity with
respect to borrowing or lending amounts equals one half when both quantities are symmetric, then
the interbank rate always lies in middle of the corridor and the distances between the interbank
RIBt and each of the two effective rates R
L
t and R
B
t are equal. Furthermore, in the case of a
match-efficient interbank market, all market interest rates coincide with the interbank rate.35 This
is true also for the household deposit rate, by virtue of the fact that RDt ∈ [RLt , RBt ].
This regime resembles a corridor system like the one used by the ECB prior to 2009. The
balance sheet was essentially zero (in terms of excess reserves) and the interbank rate was in the
middle of the corridor.
4.2 Large balance sheet
We contrast the lean balance sheet system with the case in which the central bank’s bond holdings
(normalized by the volume of interbank borrowing orders) becomes arbitrarily large, bG,CBt →∞.36
From equation (37), the interbank market becomes arbitrarily slack in this case: θt  0. This
in turn implies ΓLt  0, i.e. lending orders are matched with a vanishingly small probability.
Also, borrowers’ matching probability increases relative to the lean balance sheet case, ΓBt ≥
Υ (1, 1), and converges to one under asymptotic match efficiency. So the effective interbank lending
and borrowing rates converge, respectively, to the interest on reserves and (under asymptotic
35An implication of RLt = R
B
t is that ω
B
t = ω
L
t ≡ ω¯t, such that there is no intermediate segment of banks
that neither borrow nor lend in the interbank market. Capital efficiency (equation 34) then simplifies to Ωt =
E (ω | ω ≥ ω¯t).
36bG,CBt → ∞ may require bG,CBt → ∞ (see footnote 30). Naturally, the maximum size of the central bank
balance sheet is limited by the total size of the bond market: bG,CBt ≤ bt. Hence, formally we need to consider
the limit where both the banks holdings of bond and the total stock of bonds go towards infinity: bG,CBt →∞ and
bt →∞ and bG,CBt ≤ bt . To abbreviate notation we just write bG,CBt →∞.
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match efficiency) to the actual interbank rate. The following result establishes that the latter rate
converges to the floor, pulling all other market rates with it.
Proposition 4 (Floor system) As bG,CBt → ∞, borrowing banks’ surplus share converges to
one, limbG,CBt →0 ϕ (θt) = 1. The interbank and effective lending rates converge to the bottom of the
corridor,
lim
bG,CBt →0
RIBt = limbG,CBt →0
RLt = R
DF
t .
37The only exception is the transmission to the household deposit rate RDt in the lean balance sheet case. As
discussed in Section 3, RDt depends on (R
B
t , R
L
t ) but also on other endogenous variables that are affected in general
equilibrium. As argued there too however, in our numerical implementation it is always the case that RDt ≈ RIBt ,
such that policy rate changes move deposit rates almost one-for-one also under a lean balance sheet.
If the matching technology is furthermore asymptotically match efficient, all other market rates
converge too to the bottom of the corridor,
lim
bG,CBt →0
RBt = limbG,CBt →0
RDt = R
DF
t .
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Thus, as the central bank’s bond holdings become
arbitrarily large, the economy converges to a ’floor system’, in which the central bank effectively
sets all market rates by setting the interest on reserves. This equilibrium resembles the current
situation in the euro area and other advanced economies, characterized by large excess reserves
and money market indices trading very close to the deposit facility rate.
Having characterized how balance sheet policy affect market rates, we now briefly discuss how
conventional interest-rate policy operates in our framework. From Propositions 3 and 4, it is
straightforward to see that (parallel) changes in both policy rates transmit one-for-one to market
rates under both regimes.37 Panel 1 in Figure 3 illustrates this graphically for the case of a lean
balance sheet.
4.3 Policy space with respect to the ELB
The relative position of market rates within the policy rate corridor has important implications
for monetary policy when taking into account the ELB. This section shows that the floor system
provides more policy space for conventional interest rate policy compared to the corridor system.
To see this most clearly, consider the case of match efficiency. From the household’s Euler equation
(1), our assumption of a zero net inflation target, and Propositions 3 and 4, the steady-state
interbank rate in both regimes equals
RIBss = R
D
ss = 1/β.
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That is, the interbank rate depends only on households’ discount factor and is hence independent
of monetary policy (for given inflation target). From the same propositions, one can then obtain
the steady-state level of the floor rate, i.e. the deposit facility rate.
Proposition 5 (Policy space) Assume the interbank market is match-efficient. In a corridor
system (bG,CBt = 0) the steady-state gross deposit facility rate is
RDFss = 1/β − [1− ϕ (1)]χ < 1/β. (40)
In a floor system, the steady-state deposit facility rate is
RDFss = 1/β.
Therefore, a floor system implies a wider distance between the steady-state deposit facility rate and
its ELB, 1− κ ≤ 1.
The intuition is the following. In both regimes, the steady-state interbank rate equals the
inverse of the household’s discount factor. In the corridor regime, the interbank rate lies in the
middle of the two policy rates, so necessarily the steady-state deposit facility rate must lie below
1/β, the more so the wider the corridor width χ. By contrast, in the floor regime the steady-state
deposit facility rate coincides with the steady-state interbank rate and hence is equal to 1/β. As
a result, the floor system features a wider (steady-state) distance between the deposit facility rate
and its ELB, thus allowing for more ’policy space’ for interest rate cuts in the face of deflationary
shocks. This result will play a key role in our numerical results, when we compare crisis scenarios
under both the lean-balance-sheet/corridor system and the large-balance-sheet/floor one.
We finally note that our ’policy space’ result can also be extended to the more general case of
asymptotic match efficiency, albeit with some additional complexity.38
5 Quantitative analysis
5.1 Calibration
We assume standard preferences: u(Ct) − v(Lt) = C1−γt /(1 − γ) − L1+ψt /(1 + ψ). We also use a
standard quadratic specification for investment adjustment costs: S (x) = ι
2
(x− 1)2, where ι is a
38In particular, the expression for RDFss in the corridor regime is slightly more complicated than equation (40),
as it is to prove that it lies below 1/β. This proof is available upon request.
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Parameter Value Target
α Capital share 0.33
δ Depreciation 0.025
β Discount factor 0.995
γ Risk aversion 1
ψ Inverse Frisch elasticity 0.276
θ Calvo parameter 0.779 Gertler and Karadi (2013)
 Markup 4.167
ι Investment adjustment 1.728
υ Taylor rule inflation 1.5
ρ Taylor rule persistence 0.8
κ Effective lower bound 0 ZLB
φ Leverage constraint 18.8 Steady-state leverage ratio
ζ Bond maturity 0.05 5 years average maturity
B/Y Government debt 1.34 Banks’ steady-state bond holdings
B
G,CB
Government debt held by CB 0 No QE pre crisis
χ Corridor width 0.5% Pre-crisis corridor width
ς Dividend ratio 0.975 RoE of banks
μ Mean of idiosyncratic shocks -0.023 Normalize Ω = 1
σ Std of idiosyncratic shocks 0.0028 Ratio of redistr. to productive assets
λ Matching function 225 Ratio of interbank to CB lending
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
39We calibrate the model in line with the European institutional set up. In the US the corridor system was only
implemented in 2008. At the same time the Fed flooded the market with liquidity, which drove the fed funds rate
close to the interest-on-excess-reserves floor.
scale parameter. Idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed with parameters
μ and σ. The matching function is as in Den Haan et al. (2000),
Υ

ΦLt ,Φ
B
t

=
ΦLt Φ
B
t
(ΦLt )
λ
+ (ΦBt )
λ
	1/λ .
In calibrating the standard parameters, i.e. those of the production function (α, δ), the utility
function (β, γ,ψ) and the New Keynesian elements (θ, , ι, υ, ρ), we follow Gertler and Karadi
(2013), who use the values of Primiceri et al. (2006).
Most of the remaining parameters are non-standard and relate to the banking sector. We set κ
to 0, that is we assume the ELB is zero. For the remaining parameters, we target moments from
pre-crisis euro area data (1999-2007).39 The parameter defining the corridor width χ is set to 0.5%
per quarter, which implies an annualized corridor width of 2 percentage points, as used by the ECB
before the crisis. The central bank is assumed to not hold any QE asset in the (corridor-system)
steady state, b
G,CB
= 0, as was the case prior to the crisis. Banks’ dividend ratio ς is chosen
to match the historical average real return on bank equity of 10%. The parameter defining the
maturity of government debt ζ is set to 0.05, which yields an average maturity of 5 years. The
mean of the iid shocks to island specific capital efficiency μ is set such that the steady state capital
efficiency Ωss is normalized to 1.
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Assets Liabilities
Claims on private nonfin. 62.8% 6.8% Equity
Claims on government 10.4% 66.3% Deposits
Interbank claims 26.9% 26.9% Interbank liabilities
Table 2: Aggregate bank balance sheet
40The balance sheet structure in the table defines 3 targets: 2 ratios between the three asset categories and the
ratio of equity to deposits. Since we have 3 parameters, we match the targeted structure perfectly.
41To determine this relationship numerically for the model, we compute the steady state spread and the excess
reserves to GDP ratio for different values of b¯G,CB . As an alternative more consistent with the time series nature
of our data, we also determined this relationship using a dynamic perfect foresight simulation. In this simulation
the economy starts at the steady state with 0 bond holdings. Then the balance sheet is gradually expanded. No
shocks occur. The numerical results are virtually identical.
Notice also that, as empirical proxy for the model’s interbank rate, we take the EUREPO rate. The latter,
contrary e.g. to EONIA, is based on secured interbank transactions and is hence a closer counterpart to RIBt , which
carries no default risk.
42We use weekly observations from 1999-2017. We weight the observations by the probability density function of
the data, which we approximate by a histogram of 30 equal spaced bins. This allows us to get a good overall fit
of the relationship despite having many more observations close to zero than for higher values of excess reserves.
Finally notice that in the data the corridor was changed over time while we abstract from this policy in the model.
Normalization by division through the corridor width yields similar results.
43Figure 10 in Appendix C shows that similar relationships between the amount of excess reserves and the
interbank-reserves interest rate spread hold for other major currency areas, such as the US, Japan and the UK.
We choose the parameters b, φ and σ to match the average structure of the aggregate balance
sheet of the monetary financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro area over the years 1999-2007
according to ECB data. Table 2 reports the targeted balance sheet.40 The government debt level
we obtain (b) hence reflects only the debt held by the banks. Appendix D describes in detail how
we aggregated the data to arrive to this stylized aggregate balance sheet.
The matching function parameter λ is set such that the model reproduces the empirical rela-
tionship between excess reserves over GDP and the interbank-deposit facility rate spread during
the entire euro period (1999-2017).41 In particular, we choose λ to minimize the weighted mean
absolute error between the data and the model prediction.42 As shown in Figure 4, our calibrated
model replicates the relationship between excess reserves and the interbank-DFR spread fairly
well, both for the pre-crisis corridor system in which this spread fluctuated around 1% (i.e. one
half of the corridor width) and for the current floor system in which it is essentially zero.43 The
resulting value for λ is very high, implying almost exact match-efficiency. As a result, in the ab-
sence of central bank bond holdings only 0.08% of banks’ assets are excess reserves, a negligible
number albeit an order of magnitude larger than in the pre-crisis data (0.006%). Furthermore our
calibration yields a ratio of total bank assets to GDP of 3.1, which is close to its data counterpart
of 2.6.
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Figure 4: This figure shows the realtionship between the EUREPO-DF spread and the excess
reserves in the steady state of the model and in weekly EMA data (colours indicate time from
1999 (blue) to 2017 (red)). Since the shortest available maturity for the EUREPO is 4 weeks, we
approximated the expected DFR over the next 4 weeks by the materialized DFR.
5.2 Comparative statics: the role of the central bank balance-sheet
size
We start our numerical analysis by investigating the effect of the balance-sheet size on the steady
state equilibrium. Figure 5 plots the relationship between the steady-state value of a number of
endogenous variables and the endogenous excess reserves/GDP ratio, as we vary the steady-state
real market value of central bank’s bond holdings b¯G,CB (starting from zero).44 As the ratio of
reserves increases, the interest rates on deposits RDss and interbank loans R
IB
ss both converge to each
other and all rates converge to the bottom of the corridor, RDFss . This means that the interbank-
DFR spread also converges to zero (as shown already in Figure 4), consistently with Proposition
2.
The top panels show that both steady state GDP and welfare (the latter in consumption-
equivalent units) increase in the ratio of excess reserves. This is the result of the reduction in
central bank seigniorage. These profits result from the difference in the remuneration on the central
44Since our calibrated matching function implies approximate match-efficiency, by the arguments of Section 3 the
increase in the central bank’s bond holdings translates almost one-for-one into an increase in reserves. Thus, using
bond holdings over GDP as the x-axis variable in Figure 5 would make basically no difference (other than the fact
that the reserves ratio is very small but not exactly zero for bG,CBss = 0.
bank’s assets and liabilities. In particular,
ΠCBss = R
G
ssb¯
G,CB +RLFss

1− ΓBss

ΦBss −RDFss

1− ΓLss

ΦLss,
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Figure 5: This figure illustrates the effect of the central bank’s balance sheet size in steady state.
The upper left panel displays deviations from the steady state associated with a balance sheet size
of 0. The welfare difference is measured in current consumption equivalents. The upper right panel
displays central banks profits as % of GDP.
where RLFss = R
DF
ss + χ and R
G
ss = R
L
ss > R
DF
ss . As the size of the balance sheet increases, the
per unit margin goes down faster such that total profits drop. Since the profits raised by the
central bank act like a tax on banks and hence on capital returns, they distort the household’s
savings decision. Therefore, lower profits imply higher welfare.45 However, as the upper two panels
demonstrate, these effects are quantitatively rather negligible.
5.3 Balance sheet policies at the ELB
Next we consider the dynamic implications of different balance sheet policies when the economy
is driven to the ELB. To bring the economy there, we consider a time-varying household discount
factor and simulate a temporary shock to it. We consider four different scenarios, which differ only
in the central bank’s balance sheet policy:
(i) A lean initial balance sheet with no unconventional policy response to the crisis: bG,CBt = 0 ∀t.
45Since our model features multiple distortions, it is not a priori clear that an increase in one distortion must
decrease welfare. Nevertheless, this numerical finding is intuitive since central bank profits act like a tax on capital
(hence causing underinvestment) and none of the other frictions leads to overinvestment.
(ii) A large initial balance sheet but no unconventional policy response to the crisis: bG,CBt =
b
G,CB
> 0 ∀t.
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(iii) Starting from the same lean balance sheet as in scenario (i), the central bank implements a
temporary bond purchase program.
(iv) Starting from the same lean balance sheet as in scenario (i), the central bank implements the
same temporary bond purchase program as in scenario (iii), but with a 1 year delay.
In all four cases the interest rate policy follows the same Taylor rule, and the economy is
assumed to rest at the corresponding steady state before the shock (assumed to take place at time
t = 1). At t = 1, the discount factor β increases, and then it gradually converges back to its
steady state value following an AR(1) process; once the shock arrives, its future path is perfectly
foreseen thereafter.46 We choose the size of the shock — common to all scenarios — such that the
ELB constraint binds for 10 quarters under scenario (i). In scenario (ii) we consider an initial
balance sheet size of 5% of GDP, a level high enough that RIBss  RDFss and hence the economy
effectively rests in a floor regime.47 In scenario (iii), we assume the central bank purchases bonds
for 2 periods at a speed of 1% of steady state GDP per quarter, reinvests for one period, and then
lets its bond portfolio mature;48 this path for bond holdings is announced contemporaneously to
the crisis shock. Finally, in scenario 4, we assume the central bank implements the same bond
purchase program, but with a 4 quarter lag.
The blue lines Figure 6 display the economy’s response in scenario (i), i.e. under a lean balance
sheet and no QE. As households become more patient, they postpone consumption, driving down
aggregate demand and inflation. The central bank responds to the fall in inflation by lowering its
two policy rates — holding the corridor width constant —, but the deposit facility rate hits the ELB,
preventing further (conventional) monetary accommodation for some periods.
The red lines show the responses in scenario (ii), where the central bank permanently operates
a large balance sheet, i.e. a floor system. In this case the response of output and inflation is
more muted and welfare is higher relative to scenario (i). This results from the fact that, in a
floor system, the central bank has more policy space for conventional interest-rate policy, since the
associated steady-state level of the DFR is higher than under a lean balance sheet (Proposition 5).
46We solve for the paths of the endogenous variables using the Newton-based perfect foresight solver for the
non-linear model implemented in DYNARE. Notice that the future path of the exogenous variables (β and the
unconventional policy response, if any) is revealed on the impact period.
Computing the nonlinear solution has two advantages: It allows us to consider the ELB and to capture the highly
nonlinear relationship between the central bank balance sheet size and the real variables.
47As shown in Figure 4, in the euro area for excess reserve ratios above 5% the spread between the interbank rate
and the DFR is stabilized at near-zero levels.
48In terms of the rule in equation (30) for central bank’s bond holdings, we thus assume npt = 0.01×Y annual for
t = 1, 2 and rit = 1 for t = 1, 2, 3.
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Figure 6: This figure shows the responses of key variables to the shock under the different assump-
tions about unconventional monetary policy. The top row compares 3 variables across different
scenarios. Each of the panels in the bottom row shows the corridor rates and the interbank rate
in one of the 3 scenarios. The interbank rate under the first scenario is reproduced in all panels
for comparison. The deposit rate is not plotted, however it is virtually identical to the interbank
rate. Figure 9 in Appendix C shows further varibles for the same simulations.
For our calibration, the additional stimulus afforded by the larger policy rate cut is actually enough
to prevent the ELB from binding. This results in higher output, inflation and welfare. As shown
in Table 3, the percentage drop on impact in output and (annualized) inflation is, respectively, 1.2
and 2.1 percentage points smaller than in scenario (i).
The yellow lines in Figure 6 display responses in scenario (iii), where the economy starts from
the same lean balance sheet as in scenario (i), but the central bank engages in temporary asset
purchases. This scenario illustrates in general equilibrium our ’interbank transmission channel’ of
temporary QE policies. As the central bank purchases bonds, the supply of funds to the interbank
market increases, lowering its tightness and hence the interbank interest rate (for given interest on
reserves). The lower interbank rate is passed through to households’ deposit rate, thus stimulating
their consumption. A temporary QE program thus allows the central bank to add further stimulus
during a binding-ELB episode by pushing interbank interest rates, and all other market rates across
the economy, towards the bottom of the interest rate corridor. In fact, under our calibration the
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lean balance sheet (i) vs ... Output Inflation
large balance sheet (ii) 1.2 ppt 2.1 ppt
lean balance sheet with temporary asset purchases (iii) 1.2 ppt 2.1 ppt
lean balance sheet with delayed temporary asset purchases (iv) 0.8 ppt 1.6 ppt
Table 3: Differences between the lean balance sheet and the other three scenarios (on impact)
expansionary effect is strong enough that the DFR stays above the ELB.49 As shown in Table 3,
the stabilization gains from this temporary QE are the same (up to the first decimal) as those of
the floor regime.
Finally, scenario (iv) deviates from scenario (iii) in that the balance sheet expansion starts
with an (anticipated) delay of 4 quarters relative to the crisis shock. While the central bank’s
intervention is successful in lifting the economy from the ELB once it eventually comes into force,
the economy stays at the ELB for the first 4 quarters. Output, inflation and welfare are hence
higher than under the lean balance sheet scenario (i) but lower than under scenarios (ii) and
(iii). Indeed, these differences are significant as table 3 highlights: On impact, the delay causes
additional drops of output and inflation of 0.4 and 0.5 ppt.50
Comparing the latter three scenarios highlights an important result of our model: temporary
QE — i.e. temporary excess liquidity provision — and a permanently large balance sheet — i.e.
permanent excess liquidity provision — are close substitutes, provided the former is implemented in
a timely manner. In that case, both regimes are able to compress the spread between market rates
and the DFR when it is most needed, i.e. during a ELB episode, or at least (as in our simulations)
at times when the ELB would otherwise bind. If however QE is not implemented promptly enough
(e.g. because of operational complexities or institutional constraints), then the lean-balance-sheet
regime underperforms compared to the case of a permanently large balance sheet.
6 Further analysis
6.1 On the marginal effectiveness of balance sheet expansions
In section 3 we showed analytically that bond purchases are subject to (a weak form of) decreasing
marginal effects on market rates. In this subsection we analyze numerically the marginal effective-
ness of balance sheet policies, not only on market rates but also on macroeconomic outcomes. To
this end we compare the response of the economy in scenario (iii) above with three alternative
49Notice that QE is only really effective at the ELB, when conventional monetary policy looses control over the
interbank rate RIB . During normal times conventional monetary policy (as described by the taylor rule) undoes
the effect of quantitative measures.
50In scenario (iv) the delayed QE is announced and anticipated in the impact quarter (t = 1). The paths for
output, inflation and welfare would be even lower if the QE program were to come as a surprise in t = 5.
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Figure 7: The panels in the first row of this figure compare the responses of key variables to a
time preference shock under different assumptions about unconventional monetary policy. Output,
inflation and welfare are expressed in deviations from the respective paths under the most aggresive
balance sheet expansion. Each panel in the second row shows the evolution of the corridor and
the interbank rates for one of the 4 scenarios.
51Unlike in the previous section, we now simulate a larger crisis shock, so that none of the four scenarios avoids
hitting the ELB.
scenarios where the path of bond purchases is as in the former scenario but scaled up or down. In
particular, these scenarios feature bond purchases worth 1/3%, 2/3%, 1% and 4/3% of steady-state
GDP for 2 quarters.51 Figure 7 compares the responses of key variables. The variables in the first
row are expressed in percent deviations from the path of the corresponding variable in the fourth
scenario, i.e. the one that features the largest balance sheet expansion.
Comparing the four scenarios we observe how the marginal effect of the central banks balance
sheet expansion declines as the balance sheet increases. While extending purchases from 1/3%
of GDP to 2/3% of GDP increases GDP by 0.4% at the peak, expending purchases to 1% of
GDP only results in an additional increase of roughly 0.05%. Any further expansion is essentially
irrelevant for output. A similar pattern holds for inflation. This numerical general equilibrium
result complements proposition 2, which showed that the marginal effect of QE on the interbank
rate exhibits decreasing returns to scale and converges towards 0 as the balance sheet size is
expanded.
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This feature of the model is consistent with the empirical finding by Reis (2016) that only the
first QE announcement in the US had a significant effect on inflation expectations, while for later
QE announcements, when the Fed’s balance sheet was already large, little to no effect can be found
in the data.
6.2 Central bank asset composition
So far we have assumed that balance sheet policies take the exclusive form of bond purchases. In
reality, central banks have also implemented programs aimed at providing large amounts of credit
to the banking sector under more favorable conditions (in terms e.g. of pricing) than those of their
lending facilities. In this section, we extend the model to allow the central bank to engage in this
kind of program. We show that all our previous results go through: What matters in our model is
how much excess liquidity is created through balance-sheet policies, not which assets are financed
with it.
Assume in particular that, once banks draw their idiosyncratic shock ωjt , they can obtain credit
Bj,CBt from the central bank at the administered rate R
CF
t .
52 This rate is lies within the corridor,
but it is lower than the lending facility rate, RLFt , so it is effectively subsidized. In equilibrium the
effective borrowing rate equates this credit rate RCFt = R
B
t .
53 It is trivial to show that the demand
and supply for interbank loans in Lemma 1 now becomes
B+,jt =

(φ− 1)N jt −Djt −Bj,CBt , if ωjt > ωBt ,
0, if ωjt < ω
B
t ,
(41)
   
52Central banks’ large-scale credit operations typically took place only at certain dates and hence lacked the
standing nature of lending facilities. To capture the latter feature in our model, we assume that, after each period’s
interbank trading round, those borrowing orders that have failed to find a lending bank can no longer be funded
with central bank subsidized credit.
53We focus here on equilibria where the constraint Bj,CBt ≥ 0 is slack. In any such equilibria borrowing banks
must be indifferent between going to the interbank market or directly to this credit facility.
Defining BCBt ≡
 1
0
Bj,CBt dj the aggregate amount of such credit operations, aggregate interbank
borrowing orders are now given by
ΦBt = [(φ− 1)Nt −Dt]

1− F

ωBt

−BCBt .
The central bank’s balance sheet constraint now includes the new asset class,
BCBt + b
G,CB
t + Φ
B
t

1− ΓBt

= ΦLt

1− ΓLt

,
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Banks equity now evolves as
Nt
ς
= RAt Ωt−1Q
K
t−1Kt−1 +
RLt−1
1 + πt
ΦLt−1 +
RGt
1 + πt
bGt−1 −
RDt−1
1 + πt
Dt−1 −
RBt−1
1 + πt
ΦBt−1 −
RBt−1
1 + πt
BCBt−1.
All other equilibrium conditions remain unchanged.
In our model, the main difference between central bank’s bond purchases and subsidized credit
operations is that, ceteris paribus, the former increases the supply of funds to the interbank market,
ΦLt , whereas the latter reduces the demand for interbank funds, Φ
B
t .
54 As it turns out, any equi-
librium allocation that can be sustained with bond purchases can also alternatively be sustained
with subsidized credit operations, as the following result establishes:
Proposition 6 (Equivalence of loan and bond programs) Assuming perfect foresight, let X
be the set of equilibrium sequences for all t (prices, quantities and exogenous processes). Consider
a particular sequence {x∗t}∞t=0 ∈ X which satisfies the following conditions:
1. The central bank holds some government bonds: bG,CB∗t > 0 for some t.
2. The central bank never extends any subsidized loans to banks: BCB∗t = 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
Then there exists another sequence

x+t
∞
t=0
∈ X with identical initial conditions x+0 = x∗0,
which satisfies:
1. The central bank purchases no bonds: bG,CB+t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
2. At each t at which the central bank holds bonds in x∗t , it extends a positive but smaller amount
of subsidized loans to banks in x+t . In particular
BCB+t = b
G,CB∗
t Γ
L∗
t ≤ b
G,CB∗
t , ∀t ≥ 1.
3. The sequences of all equilibrium variables besides BCB+t , b
G,CB+
t , Φ
B+
t , b
G+
t and Φ
L+
t are
equal in both sequences.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. This proposition states that it is essentially irrelevant
which of the two instruments the central bank uses to affect the liquidity conditions in the interbank
market. The intuition is that, by purchasing bonds, the central bank increases the supply of funds
to the interbank market, while by providing loans to banks it reduces the demand of interbank
54A second, comparatively minor difference is that the maximum size of the lending program is given by borrowing
banks’ total demand for funds, [(φ − 1)Nt −Dt]

1− F

ωBt

, whereas bond purchases are limited by the size of
the bond market, bt.
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Figure 8: This figure shows by how much the central bank needs to expand its balance sheet by
issuing bonds in order to obtain the allocation associated with the amount of governemnet bond
purchases on the x axis. On both axis, the excess reserves are expressed as fraction of steady state
GDP. The dashed line is the 45 degree line.
55Due to the different (long-term) government bonds and (one-period) credit operations, our equivalence result
holds only under perfect foresight. With aggregate uncertainty, interest rate risk would matter and the result would
hold exactly only if government bonds had the same maturity as credit operations; the result would still holds up
to a first order approximation in the first period of the implementation of either program.
56These simulations are not shown here for brevity but are available upon request.
funds. Both interventions can equally increase the ratio of interbank borrowing over lending
orders, which in turn affects each side’s matching probabilities and surplus share.55 Importantly,
this proposition implies that all previous propositions, relative to the effect of bond purchases,
have counterparts relative to the effects of credit operations.
The proposition entails an interesting detail. The central bank can obtain the allocation associ-
ated with a certain level of public bond purchases by alternatively issuing a smaller level of credit
operations (BCB+t ≤ bG,CB∗t ). Figure 8 shows this relationship in steady state for the calibrated
model. As the figure shows, the larger the balance sheet is, the larger is the difference between the
amounts required in the two cases. For instance, to obtain the same steady state allocation asso-
ciated to a balance sheet size of 15% of GDP achieved by expanding bonds holdings, the central
bank would alternatively need to expand credit operations until achieving a balance sheet size of
about 13% of GDP.
We have also repeated the dynamic simulations in the previous section assuming that, instead
of purchasing bonds, the central bank implements credit operations in the same amounts. We find
the differences to be quantitatively negligible.56 This is in line with the fact that the empirical
relationship between volume and return spread of excess reserves seen in Figure 4 seems not to be
affected by the fact that the ECB’s balance sheet policies went through two differentiated phases,
with credit operations dominating until 2015 and asset purchases largely taking over from there
on (see again Figure 1).
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7 Conclusion
The quantitative easing (QE) policies implemented by central banks across many advanced economies
in order to combat the effect of the recent crisis has given rise to an unprecedented increase in
the size of their balance sheets and the volume of excess reserves, which in parallel has pushed
interbank and other money market rates towards their floor: the interest on excess reserves (‘floor
system’). With macroeconomic fundamentals gradually improving, such central banks now face
the dilemma as to whether to keep this large balance sheet/floor regime, or else to return to the
relatively small pre-crisis balance sheets with low levels of excess reserves and interbank rates
trading in the middle of the corridor formed by central banks’ lending and deposit facility rates
(‘corridor system’). This paper has proposed a New Keynesian model with a banking sector and
an interbank market characterized by search and matching friction with the aim of comparing the
stabilization and welfare properties of the floor and corridor regimes.
Our analysis has first uncovered a novel mechanism through which QE can be effective, over-
turning the famous irrelevance result of Wallace (1981) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Because of matching frictions in the interbank market, the position of the equilibrium interbank
rate — and of other market rates relevant for private spending — inside the corridor depends on
the relative volumes of lending and borrowing orders, i.e. on interbank market tightness. By
purchasing government bonds or run credit operations with banks, the central bank can make the
interbank market more slack and thus push the interbank rate down towards the bottom of the
corridor, thus stimulating economic activity. Our model replicates well the observed relationship
between the quantity of excess reserves and the spread between money market rates and the de-
posit facility rate in the euro area. It also speaks to empirical evidence in studies such as Reis
(2016) — where the first QE program in the US is found to be more effective than subsequent ones
— and Christensen and Krogstrup (2018) — where the reserves expansion produced by QE affects
the economy through banks’ portfolios, regardless of the type of assets being purchased.
Comparing lean vs. large balance sheet regimes, we find that the latter provides the central
bank with more policy space for conventional interest rate policy vis-à-vis the effective lower
bound (ELB). At the same time, we show that a regime that combines a lean balance sheet with
temporary but quick balance sheet expansions at the ZLB provides a very similar degree of policy
accommodation. In practice, though, such quick adjustments of the central bank balance sheet
might be difficult for operational or institutional reasons. In those cases, our model provides a
rationale for choosing a floor over a corridor system, even for normal times. Such a floor system
requires the central bank to hold an amount of assets large enough to drive the spread between
the interbank and the deposit facility rate to (close to) zero.
Some caveats are in order. Our model ignores a number of factors that are potentially relevant
for the design of central banks’ balance sheet size (and composition), such as the potential for
operating losses and the resulting implications for their intertemporal insolvency and — ultimately
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— their independence from fiscal authorities (see e.g. Hall and Reis 2015 and Del Negro and Sims
2015), as well as financial stability concerns (Greenwood et al. 2016). Hence, our analysis should
be viewed as suggesting an additional, complementary argument to be considered in this debate.
Finally, our results depend on the central bank charging a positive spread between its deposit
and lending facility rates. This policy has a centuries old tradition going back to Bagehot, is
ubiquitous until today, and the size of the spread is typically non-negligible. However, we did
not explicitly model a reason for why such a spread exists. Instead, we assumed the existence
of an interest rate corridor (with an exogenous width) and then assessed the implications of our
framework for the stabilization properties of small- and large-balance-sheet regimes. In fact, the
modern academic literature is largely silent on the question as to why and how to set such a
spread. Understanding this issue better, and especially integrating the resulting insights into
DSGE environments like the one proposed here, is an important task that we leave for future
research.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
References
[1] Afonso, Gara and Lagos, Ricardo (2015). "Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds,"
Econometrica, 83 (1), 263-313.
[2] Armenter, Roc and Lester, Benjamin (2017). "Excess Reserves and Monetary Policy Imple-
mentation," Review of Economic Dynamics, 23, 212-235.
[3] Atkeson, Andrew, Eisfeldt, Andrea L. and Weill, Pierre-Olivier (2015). “Entry and Exit in
OTC Derivatives Markets”, Econometrica, 83 (6), 2231-2292.
[4] Bech, Morten and Monnet, Cyril (2016). "A search-based model of the interbank money
market and monetary policy implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, 164(C), 32-67.
[5] Bernanke, Ben (2016). “Should the Fed keep its balance sheet large?”, September 2, Blog
entry.
[6] Bianchi, Javier and Bigio, Saki (2017). "Banks, Liquidity Management, and Monetary Policy,"
Working paper.
[7] Christensen, Jens and Krogstrup, Signe (2017). "A Portfolio Model of Quantitative Easing"
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2016-12.
[8] Christensen, Jens and Krogstrup, Signe (2018). "Transmission of Quantitative Easing: The
Role of Central Bank Reserves", Economic Journal, forthcoming.
[9] Buera, Francisco and Moll, Benjamin (2015). Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch: The
Importance of Heterogeneity, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(3), 1-42.
[10] Bullard, James (2017). "The Role of the Fed’s Balance Sheet for
the U.S. Monetary Policy Outlook in 2017", GWU Alumni Lec-
ture in Economics, George Washington University, February 28. Link:
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Bullard/remarks/2017/Bullard_GWU_Alum
[11] Chen, Han, Cúrdia, Vasco and Ferrero, Andrea (2012). "The Macroeconomic Effects of Large-
scale Asset Purchase Programmes", The Economic Journal, 122, 289-315.
[12] Cúrdia, Vasco and Woodford, Michael (2011). "The central-bank balance sheet as an instru-
ment of monetarypolicy", Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, 58(1), 54-79.
[13] Calvo, Guillermo, (1983). "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework", Journal of
Monetary Economics, 12(3), 383-398.
Alumni_Lect
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
[14] Del Negro, Marco and Sims, Christopher (2015). "When does a central bank’s balance sheet
require fiscal support?," Journal of Monetary Economics, 73(C), 1-19.
[15] Eggertsson, Gauti and Woodford, Michael (2003). "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and
Optimal Monetary Policy." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2003(1), 139-211.
[16] den Haan, Wouter, Ramey, Garey andWatson, Joel (2000). "Job Destruction and Propagation
of Shocks," American Economic Review, 90(3), 482-498.
[17] Gertler, Mark and Karadi, Peter (2011). "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 58(1), 17-34.
[18] Gertler, Mark and Karadi, Peter (2013). "QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3. . . : A Framework for Analyzing
Large-Scale Asset Purchases as a Monetary Policy Tool," International Journal of Central
Banking, 9(1), 5-53.
[19] Gertler, Mark and Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro (2010). "Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy
in Business Cycle Analysis," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman
& Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter
11, pages 547-599.
[20] Greenwood, Robin, Hanson, Samuel and Stein, Jeremy (2016). “The Federal Reserve’s Balance
Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool.” 2016 Economic Policy Symposium Proceedings. Jackson
Hole: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
[21] Hall, Robert and Reis, Ricardo (2015). "Maintaining Central-Bank Financial Stability under
New-Style Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 21173, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[22] Ireland, Peter (2014). "The Macroeconomic Effects Of Interest On Reserves," Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 18(6), 1271-1312.
[23] Moen, Espen (1997). "Competitive Search Equilibrium", Journal of Political Economy, 105(2),
385-411.
[24] Mortensen, Dale and Pissarides, Christopher (1999). "Job reallocation, employment fluctu-
ations and unemployment," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford
(ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 1171-1228 Else-
vier.
[25] Nuño, Galo, and Thomas, Carlos (2017). "Bank Leverage Cycles." American Economic Jour-
nal: Macroeconomics, 9(2), 32-72.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
[26] Poole, William. (1968). "Commercial bank reserve management in a stochastic model: impli-
cations for monetary policy", The Journal of Finance, 23, 769-791.
[27] Primiceri, Giorio, Schaumburg, Ernst and Tambalotti, Andrea (2006). "Intertemporal distur-
bances", NBER WP12243.
[28] Reis, Ricardo (2016). "Funding Quantitative Easing to Target Inflation," in: Designing Re-
silient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future, Jackson Hole Economic Policy Sympo-
sium: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
[29] Wallace, Neil (1981). "AModigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations," The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 71(3), 267-74
[30] Woodford, Michael (2001). "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 33(3), 669-728.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Bank’s problem)
Bank j’s problem at the beginning of period t is the following,
Vt(N
j
t ) = max
Djt

V¯t(N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω)dF (ω) ,
V¯t(N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = max
Ajt≥0,b
G,j
t ≥0,B
+,j
t ≥0,B
−,j
t ≥0
EtΛt,t+1

(1− ς)Ejt+1 + Vt+1(ςE
j
t+1)

,
where
Ejt+1 = R
A
t+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j
t +
RGt+1b
j,G
t +R
L
t B
−,j
t
1 + πt+1
− R
D
t D
j
t +R
B
t B
+,j
t
1 + πt+1
. (44)
subject to
QKt A
j
t + b
G,j
t +B
−,j
t = N
j
t +B
+,j
t +D
j
t , (42)
QKt A
j
t ≤ φN jt , (43)
We use (42) to substitute for Bj,+t in the above problem. Let λ
j
At,λ
j
Gt,λ
+,j
Bt ,λ
−,j
Bt ,λ
j
φt denote the
Lagrange multipliers associated to Ajt ≥ 0, bG,jt ≥ 0, B+,jt ≥ 0, B−,jt ≥ 0 and the leverage constraint
(43), respectively. A solution to the banks problem must satisfy both the FOC with respect to
Djt , A
j
t , b
G,j
t , B
−,j
t , given respectively by

∂V¯t
∂Djt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω)dF (ω) = 0, (45)
EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RBt
1 + πt+1

+
λjAt
QKt
+ λ+,jBt − λ
j
φt = 0, (46)
EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)

RGt+1 −RBt
1 + πt+1

+ λjGt + λ
+,j
Bt = 0, (47)
EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)

RLt −RBt
1 + πt+1

+ λ−,jBt + λ
+,j
Bt = 0 (48)
and the Kuhn Tucker conditions
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min

Ajt , λ
j
At

= 0, (49)
min

bG,jt , λ
j
Gt
	
= 0, (50)
min

B−,jt , λ
+,j
Bt

= 0 where B−,jt = Q
K
t A
j
t + b
G,j
t +B
−,j
t −N jt −Djt , (51)
min

B−,jt , λ
−,j
Bt

= 0, (52)
min

φN jt −QKt A
j
t , λ
j
φt

= 0. (53)
Using the envelope condition
∂V¯t
∂Djt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)

RBt −RDt
1 + πt+1

− λ+,jBt (54)
using N jt+1 = ςE
j
t+1 we can express the FOC with respect to deposits (45) as
57

EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)

RBt −RDt
1 + πt+1

dF (ω)−

λ+,jBt dF (ω) = 0. (55)
The marginal value of equity is given by the envelope condition
V t (N
j
t ) =

∂V¯t
∂N jt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω)dF (ω) , (56)
where
∂V¯t
∂N jt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = EtΛt,t+1

1− ς + ςV t+1(N
j
t+1)
 RBt
1 + πt+1
− λ+,jBt + λ
j
φtφ. (57)
We guess that in equilibrium V t (N
j
t ) ≡ λNt is equalized across banks. Let Λ˜t,t+1 ≡ Λt,t+1

1− ς + ςλNt+1

.
We also make use of the fact that in equilibrium RBt ≥ RLt , as shown in Section 2.7 in the main
text.
Conjectured solution. We conjecture the following solution for the bank’s problem. For
some thresholds ωBt ,ω
L
t to be derived below:
• Banks with ωjt > ωBt borrow in the interbank market up to the leverage constraint,
Ajt = φN
j
t /Q
K
t ,
B+,jt = (φ− 1)N jt −Djt ,
57Notice that the first integrand in equation (55) depends on ωjt through the term N
j
t+1 = ςE
j
t+1, where in turn
Ejt+1 is given by equation (44).
bG,jt = B
−,j
t = 0,
together with λjAt = λ
+,j
Bt = 0 < λ
j
φt, and λ
j
Gt,λ
−,j
Bt ≥ 0;
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• Banks with ωjt ∈ [ωLt ,ωBt ] invest their equity and deposits in real assets,
Ajt = (N
j
t +D
j
t )/Q
K
t ≤ φN
j
t /Q
K
t ,
bG,jt = B
−,j
t = B
+,j
t = 0,
together with λjAt = λ
j
φt = 0 ≤ λ
−,j
Bt ,λ
j
Gt,λ
+,j
Bt , the latter with strict inequality if ω
j
t ∈ (ωLt ,ωBt );
• Banks with ωjt < ωLt invest their equity and deposits in the interbank and government bond
markets,
Ajt = B
+,j
t = 0,
bG,jt +B
−,j
t = N
j
t +D
j
t ,
together with λjGt = λ
−,j
Bt = λ
j
φt = 0 < λ
j
At and λ
+,j
Bt ≥ 0.
Also, each bank’s deposits Djt are not determined but are only required to be in the range
[0, (φ− 1)N jt ].
Verifying the conjecture. We now use our conjectured solution to evaluate the FOCs
conditional on ωjt :
• FOC with respect to Ajt :
— Case ωjt > ωBt :
λjφt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RBt
1 + πt+1

> 0⇔ ωjt >
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt
1+πt+1

Et

Λ˜t,t+1RAt+1
 ≡ ωBt . (58)
— Case ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt :
λ+,jBt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RBt
1 + πt+1
−RAt+1ω
j
t

≥ Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RBt
1 + πt+1
−RAt+1ωBt

= 0.
(59)
— Case ωjt < ωLt :
Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RBt
1 + πt+1

+
λjAt
QKt
+ λ+,jBt = 0. (60)
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• FOC with respect to bG,jt :
— Case ωjt > ωBt :
λjGt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt −RGt+1
1 + πt+1

≥ 0 (61)
— Case ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt :
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RGt+1 −RBt
1 + πt+1

+ λjGt + λ
+,j
Bt = 0 (62)
— Case ωjt < ωLt :
λ+,jBt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt −RGt+1
1 + πt+1

≥ 0, (63)
where in (61) and (63) we conjecture (and verify below) that
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt
1 + πt+1

≥ Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RGt+1
1 + πt+1

.
• FOC with respect to B−,jt :
— Case ωjt > ωBt :
λ−,jBt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt −RLt
1 + πt+1

≥ 0, (64)
— Case ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt :
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RLt −RBt
1 + πt+1

+ λ−,jBt + λ
+,j
Bt = 0, (65)
— Case ωjt < ωLt :
λ+,jBt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt −RLt
1 + πt+1

≥ 0. (66)
• The Kuhn Tucker conditions (49), (50), (52), (53) are obviously satisfied as well. 51 obviously
holds for ωjt ≤ ωBt . For ω
j
t > ω
B
t this condition holds since we conjecturedB
−,j
t = (φ− 1)N jt −
Djt and D
j
t ∈ [0, (φ− 1)N jt ].
Equations (63) and (66) imply
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RLt
1 + πt+1

= Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RGt+1
1 + πt+1

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 56 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1851
i.e. the (expected risk-adjusted real) return on government bonds equals the (expected risk-
adjusted real) effective lending rate RLt . The latter condition, together with the equilibrium rela-
tionship RBt ≥ RLt , verifies our conjecture that Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RBt
1+πt+1

≥ Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RGt+1
1+πt+1

. Using (66) to
substitute for λ+,jBt in (60) yields
λjAt
QKt
= Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RLt
1 + πt+1
−RAt+1ω
j
t

> 0⇔ ωjt <
Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RLt
1+πt+1

Et

Λ˜t,t+1RAt+1
 ≡ ωLt . (67)
Thus, the threshold definitions (58) and (67), together with the equilibrium relationship RBt ≥ RLt ,
imply
ωLt ≥ ωBt .
Using (59) to substitute for λ+,jBt in (65) and (62) yields, respectively,
λ−,jBt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RLt
1 + πt+1

≥ Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
L
t −
RLt
1 + πt+1

= 0,
λjGt = Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RGt+1
1 + πt+1

= Et

Λ˜t,t+1


RAt+1ω
j
t −
RLt
1 + πt+1

≥ 0.
Et
Λ˜t,t+1R
D
t
1 + πt+1
= Et
Λ˜t,t+1R
B
t
1 + πt+1
− Et
Λ˜t,t+1

RBt −RLt

1 + πt+1
F

ωLt

−
 ωBt
ωLt
EtΛ˜t,t+1


RBt
1 + πt+1
−RAt+1ω
j
t

dF (ω)
=

1− F

ωBt

Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
B
t
1 + πt+1

+ F

ωLt

Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
L
t
1 + πt+1

+

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
A
t+1

, (68)
where E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

≡

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt
−1  ωBt
ωLt
ωdF (ω). Therefore, the (expected risk-
adjusted real) marginal cost of deposits, RDt Et

Λ˜t,t+1
1+πt+1

, must equal the (expected risk-adjusted
real) marginal benefit across realizations of ωjt after the closing of the deposits market. Condi-
tional on being a high-profitability bank that is leveraged up to the maximum (ωjt ≥ ωBt ), an
Using the equilibrium values of λ+,jBt in equations (59) for ω
j
t ∈ [ωLt ,ωBt ] and (66) for ω
j
t < ω
L
t , as
well as the fact that λ+,jBt = 0 for ω
j
t > ω
B
t , we finally obtain
Equilibrium deposit rate. We can write (55) as
Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
D
t
1 + πt+1

= Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
B
t
1 + πt+1

−

λ+,jBt dF (ω) .
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additional unit of deposits will allow it to reduce its interbank funding needs by one unit, thus
saving RBt Et

Λ˜t,t+1
1+πt+1

in expected real risk-adjusted terms. Conditional on being a low-profitability
bank (ωjt ≤ ωLt ), each additional unit of deposits will be invested in interbank lending or govern-
ment bonds, which yields RLt Et

Λ˜t,t+1
1+πt+1

(= Et

Λ˜t,t+1
1+πt+1
RGt+1

). For intermediate-profitability banks
(ωLt ≤ ω
j
t ≤ ωBt ), each additional unit of deposits will be invested in real firm assets, which yields
Et

Λ˜t,t+1R
A
t+1

E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

on average.
To prove that RDt ∈ [RLt , RBt ], notice that, using the definition of the borrowing threshold ωBt
(see eq. 58), we can express (68) as
RDt =

1− F

ωBt

RBt + F

ωLt

RLt +

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt
 E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

ωBt
RBt
≤

1− F

ωBt

RBt + F

ωLt

RBt +

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

RBt = R
B
t ,
where the inequality uses both E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

≤ ωBt and the fact that in equilibrium RLt ≤
RBt . Using instead in equation (68) the definition of the lending threshold ω
L
t (eq. 58) and
the fact that E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω ≤ ωBt

≥ ωLt , one can analogously show that RDt ≥ RLt . Therefore,
RLt ≤ RDt ≤ RBt .
Value of net worth. From (54) and (57), we learn that
∂V¯t
∂N jt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) =
∂V¯t
∂Djt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) + Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RDt
1 + πt+1

+ λjφtφ.
Averaging across realizations of ωjt after the closure of the deposits market, and using (56), we
obtain the marginal value of real net worth,
λNt =

∂V¯t
∂Djt
(N jt , D
j
t ,ω
j
t)dF (ω
j
t) + Et

Λ˜t,t+1
RDt
1 + πt+1

+ φ

λjφtdF (ω
j
t)
= EtΛ˜t,t+1

RDt
1 + πt+1
+ φ

ωBt


RAt+1ω −
RBt
1 + πt+1

dF (ω)

> 0.
where in the second equality we have used (45), together with (58) and the fact λjφt = 0 for
ωjt ≤ ωBt . Additional equity allows all banks — regardless of their subsequent realization of ω
j
t —
to economize on deposit financing, which has a unit nominal cost of RDt . Moreover, equity has an
additional marginal benefit for banks that draw ωjt ≥ ωBt later in the period, because it relaxes
their leverage constraint. Notice finally that, since ωjt is iid, λ
N
t is indeed equalized across banks,
which verifies our earlier conjecture.
Deposit allocation across banks. A final note is in order. Equation (68) implies that banks
break even ex ante when taking deposits at the beginning of the period, so they are indifferent
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between taking one more units of deposits or not. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, individual
deposit-taking by each bank is not pinned down58 — although it will be pinned down in the aggregate
in general equilibrium by the households deposit supply. The only requirement, implicitly assumed
in the above conjectured (and verified) solution, is that no bank takes more deposits than
Djt ≤ (φ− 1)N jt .
For banks that draw ωjt > ω
B
t after the closure of the deposits market, the latter inequality
guarantees that Bj+t ≥ 0, i.e. they effectively need to borrow in the interbank market so as to
finance their investment in the local firm. For those that draw ωjt ∈

ωBt ,ω
B
t

, it guarantees that
QKt A
j
t ≤ φN jt , i.e. they do not find themselves with more funds than they can invest in the local
firm while still respecting the leverage constraint. The above condition can only hold for each
individual bank if it holds in aggregate:
Dt ≤ (φ− 1)Nt
Assumption 1 makes sure parameters are such that the latter condition holds and our conjecture
indeed is a solution.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 (Interbank rate)
Consider a bank with equity N jt , deposits D
j
t , and an island-specific return ω
j
t for the next period,
that accesses the interbank market in period t after making its optimal portfolio decision as per
Lemma 1. We denote the latter portfolio by Aj∗t , b
G,j∗
t , B
+,j∗
t , B
−,j∗
t . According to Lemma 1, banks
that draw ωjt > ω
B
t choose b
G,j∗
t = B
−,j∗
t = 0 and borrow in the interbank market in the amount
B+,j∗t = (φ− 1)N jt −Djt . Borrowing (and lending) orders are made on a per-unit basis. Let the
borrowing bank send its orders to a submarket offering a combination

RBt , θt

of interest rate and
(sub)market tightness.59 A fraction ΓB (θt) of orders will be matched to lending orders, in which
case each of them pays the rate RBt ; the remaining fraction fail to be matched and the bank must
borrow instead from the lending facility at rate RLFt . The value of a borrowing bank at the time
58Note that the distribution of deposits across banks is irrelevant for aggregate variables since banks are atomistic
and the idiosynchratic shock ωjt is iid.
59For simplicity, but without loss of generality, for the purpose of this derivation we assume that each bank sends
all its orders to one interbank submarket only. This is allows us to drop the subscript s relative to the notation in
the main text.
of accessing the interbank market can then be written as
V¯ Bt (N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = EtΛt,t+1

(1− ς)Ejt+1 + Vt+1(ςE
j
t+1)

, (69)
where Ejt+1 = R
A
t+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j∗
t −
RDt D
j
t
1 + πt+1
− B
+,j∗
t
1 + πt+1

ΓB (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓB (θt)

RLFt

.
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Likewise, banks that draw ωjt < ω
L
t choose B
+,j∗
t = 0 and lend in the interbank market. For a bank
sending its lending orders to the submarket with interest rate-tightness pair

RBt , θt

, a fraction
ΓL (θt) of them will be matched to borrowing orders; the remaining fraction will not and those
funds will be lent to the deposit facility at rate RLDt . Their value at the time of accessing the
interbank market can then be again written as
V¯ Lt (N
j
t , D
j
t ,ω
j
t) = EtΛt,t+1

(1− ς)Ejt+1 + Vt+1(ςE
j
t+1)

, (70)
where Ejt+1 = R
A
t+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j∗
t +
RGt+1b
j,G∗
t −RDt D
j
t
1 + πt+1
+
B−,j∗t
1 + πt+1

ΓL (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓL (θt)

RDFt

.
As explained in the text, both lending and borrowing banks choose the submarket that offers them
the highest value. Before solving the latter problem, we first express value functions in a more
convenient way. In Appendix A.1 we showed that the (beginning-of-period) value function is linear
in equity N jt : Vt+1(N
j
t+1) = λ
N
t+1N
j
t+1, where λ
N
t+1 is the common marginal value of equity at time
t + 1 across banks. Defining Λ˜t,t+1 ≡ Λt,t+1

1− ς + ςλNt+1

as in Appendix A.1, we can express
(69) and (70) as
V¯ Bt (·) = EtΛ˜t,t+1

RAt+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j∗
t −
RDt D
j
t
1 + πt+1
− B
+,j∗
t
1 + πt+1

ΓB (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓB (θt)

RLFt


,
(71)
V¯ Lt (·) = EtΛ˜t,t+1

RAt+1ω
j
tQ
K
t A
j∗
t +
RGt+1b
j,G∗
t −RDt D
j
t
1 + πt+1
+
B−,j∗t
1 + πt+1

ΓL (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓL (θt)

RDFt


,
(72)
respectively. Since the returns to search activity in the interbank market (the terms in square
brackets in equations 71 and 72) are deterministic from the point of view of period t, it follows
that value maximization with respect to

RBt , θt

is equivalent to minimization of
ΓB (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓB (θt)

RLFt ≡ RBt
in the case of borrowers, and maximization of
ΓL (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓL (θt)

RDFt ≡ RLt
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in the case of lenders. Let RL∗t denote the maximum average return that lenders can obtain. In
order to attract lenders, any submarket must therefore offer them an average return RL∗t . Subject
to this, borrowers choose the combination

RIBt , θt

that minimizes their own average borrowing
cost, i.e. they solve
∂Υ
∂x
(x, y) x+ ∂Υ
∂y
(x, y) y = Υ (x, y), or equivalently
∂Υ
∂x
(x, y)
x
Υ (x, y)
+
∂Υ
∂y
(x, y)
y
Υ (x, y)
= 1.
min
RIBt ,θt
ΓB (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓB (θt)

RLFt
s.t. ΓL (θt)R
IB
t +

1− ΓL (θt)

RDFt = R
L∗
t
The first-order conditions of this problem are
ΓB (θt) + λ
L∗
t Γ
L (θt) = 0,
dΓB
dθ

RIBt −RLFt

+ λL∗t
dΓL
dθ

RIBt −RDFt

= 0.
Combining the latter two, and using the fact that ΓL (θt) = ΓB (θt) θt and therefore dΓ
L
dθ
= dΓ
B
dθ
θt+
ΓB, we obtain 
1−
dΓL
dθ
θt
ΓL (θt)


RLFt −RIBt

=
dΓL
dθ
θt
ΓL (θt)

RIBt −RDFt

.
Letting dΓ
L(θt)
dθ
θt
ΓL(θt) ≡ ϕ (θt) denote the elasticity of lender’s matching probability with respect to
tightness, we obtain
RIBt = ϕ (θt)R
DF
t + (1− ϕ (θt))RLFt .
Finally, using ΓL (θt) =
Υ(ΦLt ,ΦBt )
ΦLt
= Υ (1, θt), we can also express ϕ (θt) as
ϕ (θt) =
∂Υ
∂ΦBt
(1, θt)
ΦBt /Φ
L
t
Υ (ΦLt ,Φ
B
t ) /Φ
L
t
=
∂Υ
∂ΦBt

ΦLt ,Φ
B
t
 ΦBt
Υ (ΦLt ,Φ
B
t )
,
where the second equality uses the fact that, for any function Υ (x, y) with constant returns to
scale, Υy (x, y) = Υy (1, y/x). Therefore, ϕ (θt) represents the elasticity of the function function
with respect to borrowing orders.
It only remains to show that ϕ (θt) ∈ [0, 1]. Let (x, y) ≡

ΦLt ,Φ
B
t

for ease of notation. Constant
returns to scale implies Υ (x, y) = xΥ (1, y/x). Differentiating with respect to x, we get
∂Υ
∂x
(x, y) = Υ

1,
y
x
	
− ∂Υ
∂y

1,
y
x
	 y
x
.
Multiplying both sides by x, using the fact that ∂Υ
∂y

1, y
x

= ∂Υ
∂y
(x, y), and rearranging, we obtain
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Therefore, the two elasticities with respect to each argument add up to one. Since both of them
must be positive, by virtue of ∂Υ
∂x
, ∂Υ
∂y
, x, y,Υ ≥ 0, it follows that each of them must be less than
one. In particular, ∂Υ
∂y
(x, y) yΥ(x,y) ≡ ϕ

y
x

≤ 1. We thus have ϕ

y
x

∈ [0, 1].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Effect of central bank bond purchases)
Since θt =

bG,CBt + 1
	−1
we have that ∂θt
∂bG,CBt
< 0. By assumption ∂ϕt
∂θt
< 0. Hence:
∂ϕt
∂bG,CBt
=
∂ϕt
∂θt
∂θt
∂bG,CBt
> 0
Combining the interbank interest rate equation (21) and the definition of the corridor (25) we
get
RIBt = R
DF
t + (1− ϕ (θt))χ.
Hence
∂RIBt −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
= −χ ∂ϕt
∂bG,CBt
< 0
Using the definitions for the other interest rates (18), (19) and (25) we get
RBt −RDFt = χ− χϕtΓBt ,
RLt −RDFt = (1− ϕt)ΓLt χ.
Using ϕt =
∂Υ(1,θt)
∂θt
θt
Υ(1,θt) , Γ
L (θt) = Υ (1, θt) and ΓB (θt) = Υ (1/θt, 1) , and simplifying we get
RBt −RDFt = χ− χ
∂Υ (1, θt)
∂θt
,
RLt −RDFt = χ


Υ (1, θt)−
∂Υ (1, θt)
∂θt
θt

.
Deriving wrt. θt we get
∂RBt −RDFt
∂θt
= −χ∂
2Υ (1, θt)
∂θ2t
> 0,
∂RLt −RDFt
∂θt
= −χ∂
2Υ (1, θt)
∂θ2t
θt > 0.
Since ∂R
B
t −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
=
∂RBt −RDFt
∂θt
∂θt
∂bG,CBt
and ∂R
L
t −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
=
∂RLt −RDFt
∂θt
∂θt
∂bG,CBt
we obtain that ∂R
B
t −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
,
∂RLt −RDFt
∂bG,CBt
<
0.
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Furthermore notice that the elasticity of Υ is bounded below and above by 0 and 1, by the
assumption of constant returns to scale:
0 ≤ ϕ = Υ θ
Υ
≤ 1
By equations (19) , (21) and (18) all rates are bounded between RDF and RLF
RDF ≤ RL ≤ RIB ≤ RB ≤ RLF
Combining the negative derivative of the distance of the three endogenous rates to the DFR with
the fact that they are bounded implies the last statement in the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Floor system)
Our assumptions about the matching function in Section 2.4 (continuity of Υ(θ), Υ(θ) ≤ θ, Υ(0) =
0) imply
lim
θ→0
Υ(θ) ≤ 1.
To see this note first that Υ(θ) =
 θ
0
Υ(θ)dθ since Υ(θ) is continous and Υ(0) = 0.
By the definition of the Rieman integral limθ→0Υ(
θ) = limθ→0
 θ
0
Υ(θ)dθ = Υ

θ
	
θ. Hence,
as Υ(θ) ≤ θ for any θ including zero then it follows that limθ→0Υ(θ) ≤ 1. Furthermore, by
assumption 0 ≤ Υ(θ). Therefore Υ(θ) is non-negative and finite.
The limit of the bargaining weight ϕ
lim
θ→0
ϕ = lim
θ→0
Υ(θ)
θ
Υ(θ)
can be rewritten as
lim
θ→0
ϕ = lim
θ→0
Υ(θ) lim
θ→0
θ
Υ(θ)
due to the finiteness of limθ→0Υ(θ) if the limit limθ→0 θΥ(θ) exists. By L’Hôpital’s rule limθ→0
θ
Υ(θ) =
limθ→0
1
Υ(θ) , which again must be finite since limθ→0Υ
(θ) is finite. Hence we can write
lim
θ→0
ϕ = lim
θ→0
Υ(θ) lim
θ→0
1
Υ(θ)
= 1.
Combining this expression with the definitions of RIB (21) and RL (18) we find that these two
interest rates converge to RDF .
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If furthermore Υ is asymptotically match efficient we have that limθ→0 ΓB(θ) = 1. To see this
note that
ΓB (θ) =
Υ

ΦL,ΦB

ΦB
= Υ

θ−1, 1

where the last equality is due to constant returns to scale. Hence
lim
θ→0
ΓB(θ) = lim
θ→0
Υ

θ−1, 1

= lim
θ−1→∞
Υ

θ−1t , 1

= 1
where the last equality followed from the definition of asymptotic match efficiency. Combining
the limits of ϕ and ΓB with the definitions of RL (13) and RD (19) we find that these two interest
rates also converge to RDF .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6 (Equivalence of loan and bond programs)
Consider a particular sequence of prices and quantities and exogenous processes {x∗t}∞t=0 ∈ X,
which constitutes an equilibrium. The sub-sequences
 
bG,CB∗t
!∞
t=0
, {N∗t }∞t=0,

ωB∗t
∞
t=0
,

ΓL∗t
∞
t=0
,
... are elements of this set. Similarly, denote the initial conditions by x∗0. Assume that in this
particular equilibrium the central bank holds some government bonds bG,CB∗t > 0 for some t but
never holds any loans to banks through direct lending programs BCB∗t = 0, ∀t ≥ 0 . Note that, for
later use, the ratio of lending and borrowing orders in this equilibrium is given by
ΦL∗t /Φ
B∗
t =
(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

−
bG∗t" %$ #
b
G∗
t − b
G,CB∗
t
	
(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ) [1− F (ωB∗t )]
, (73)
Now consider an alternative sequences

x+t
∞
t=0
, where all sub-sequences are the same as above
with a few exceptions: in x+t the central bank never holds any government bond,
bG,CB+t = 0∀t ≥ 0,
but sometimes may extend loans to banks through direct lending programs
BCB+t ≥ 0 for some t.
Also allow ΦB+t , Φ
L+
t and b
G+
t to differ from their ∗−counterparts. We will now show (by con-
struction) that a path for BCB+t , b
G,CB+
t , Φ
B+
t , b
G+
t and Φ
L+
t exists that, given the same initial
conditions x∗0 = x
+
0 , constitutes an equilibrium.
For

x+t
∞
t=0
to be an equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions explicitly stated in appendix
B1 (augmented by BCBt ) must hold together with certain implicit non-negativity constraints on
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certain variables. However, since most values in

x+t
∞
t=0
are equal to {x∗t}∞t=0, all those equilibrium
conditions that only include values that are equal for

x+t
∞
t=0
and {x∗t}∞t=0 are obviously satisfied.
There are only 8 equilibrium conditions, where the non-identical sequences BCB+t , b
G,CB+
t , Φ
B+
t ,
bG+t and Φ
L+
t show up. Replacing those +-sequences, which are identical to their ∗-counterparts,
by the latter, these 8 conditions read:60
ΦB+t = (N
∗
t (φ− 1)−D∗t )

1− F

ωB∗t

−BCB+t (74)
ΦL+t = (N
∗
t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG+t (75)
ΦL+t

1− ΓL∗t

= BCB+t + Φ
B+
t

1− ΓB∗t

(76)
N∗t = ς
RA∗t QK∗t−1Ω∗t−1K∗t−1 +
RL∗t−1
1+π∗t
ΦL∗t−1 +
RG∗t
1+π∗t
bG+t−1
− R
D∗
t
1+π∗t
D∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t
ΦB∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t
BCB+t

(77)
b
G∗
t = b
G,CB+
t + b
G+
t (78)
ΓB∗t = Υ


ΦL+t
ΦB+t
, 1

(79)
ΓL∗t = Υ


1,
ΦB+t
ΦL+t

(80)
ϕ∗t =
∂ΓL∗

ΦB+t /Φ
L
t +

∂(ΦB+t /Φ
L+
t )
ΦB+t /Φ
L+
t
ΓL∗

ΦB+t /Φ
L+
t
 (81)
Notice first that as bG,CB+t = 0, equation (78) requires that b
G+
t = b
G∗
t . Furthermore, notice
that equation (77), after subsituting for ΦB+t and Φ using (74) and (75) reads
N∗t = ς
 RA∗t QK∗t−1Ω∗t−1K∗t−1 +
RL∗t−1
1+π∗t

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG+t

+
RG∗t
1+π∗t
bG+t−1
− R
D∗
t
1+π∗t
D∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t

(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ) [1− F (ωB∗t )]−BCB+t

− R
B∗
t−1
1+π∗t
BCB+t

60Note that (77) can be derived by combining the law of motion of equity
Nt
ς
= RAt Ωt−1QKt−1Kt−1 +
RLt−1
1 + πt
ΦLt−1 +
RGt
1 + πt
bGt−1 −
RDt−1
1 + πt
Dt−1 −
RBt−1
1 + πt
ΦBt−1 −
RBt−1
1 + πt
BCBt−1,
with equations (74) and (75) to get
Nt
ς
=
 RA∗t QK∗t−1Ω∗t−1K∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t

1− F

ωB∗t−1
 
N∗t−1 (φ− 1)−D∗t−1

−BCB+t

+
RL∗t−1
1+π∗t

F

ωL∗t−1

(N∗t−1 +D
∗
t−1)− bG+t−1

+
RG∗t
1+π∗t
bG+t−1 −
RD∗t
1+π∗t
D∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t
BCB+t

and the eliminating BCB+t .
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We can eliminate BCB+t and rearrange to get
N∗t = ς
RA∗t QK∗t−1Ω∗t−1K∗t−1 +
RL∗t−1
1+π∗t

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

+
RG∗t −RL∗t−1
1+π∗t
bG+t−1
− R
D∗
t
1+π∗t
D∗t−1 −
RB∗t−1
1+π∗t
[(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ) [1− F (ωB∗t )]]

This condition satisfied for all t > 0 since in equilibrium under perfect forsight the no-arbitrage
condition (12) becomes RL∗t−1 = R
G∗
t , so that all references to +-variables can be cancelled out.
For t = 0 equation (77) holds because RL∗t−1 = R
L+
t−1 and b
G+
t−1 = b
G∗
t−1 (since we start from the same
initial conditions) and RG+t = R
G∗
t (by construction).
Next, we make the guess that ΦL+t and Φ
B+
t are such that
ΦL∗t /Φ
B∗
t = Φ
L+
t /Φ
B+
t . (82)
This immediatley implies that equations (79) - (81) are satisfied. Using equations (74,75,78) to
replace ΦL+t and Φ
B+
t and equation 73 to replace Φ
L∗
t /Φ
B∗
t in (82) we get:
(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

−

b
G∗
t − b
G,CB∗
t
	
(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ) [1− F (ωB∗t )]
=
(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG∗t
(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ) [1− F (ωB∗t )]−BCB+t
.
After rearranging terms, we obtain:
BCB+t = b
G,CB∗
t

(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t )

1− F

ωB∗t

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F (ω
L∗
t )− b
G∗
t + b
G,CB∗
t

= bG,CB∗t
ΦB∗t
ΦL∗t
. (83)
Plugging (74) and (75) into (76) we get
BCB+t +

(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t )

1− F

ωB∗t

−BCB+t
 
1− ΓB∗t

=

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG+t
 
1− ΓL∗t

,
and then taking into account the value of BCB+t in (83)
bG,CB∗t
ΦB∗t
ΦL∗t
ΓB∗t +

(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t )

1− F

ωB∗t
 
1− ΓB∗t

=

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG+t
 
1− ΓL∗t

,
Using the fact that by interbank market clearing ΓL∗t =
ΦB∗t
ΦL∗t
ΓB∗t we can write:
bG,CB∗t Γ
L∗
t +

(N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t )

1− F

ωB∗t
 
1− ΓB∗t

=

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG∗t
 
1− ΓL∗t

,
(84)
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hold. If we again plug the values of ΦL∗t and Φ
B∗
t in (the ∗−counterpart of) equations (74-75) into
(the ∗−counterpart of) equation (76) we get
Hence feasibility is always guaranteed.
Since the ∗−sequence constituted an equilibrium, the ∗−counterpart of equations (74-78) must
=0" %$ #
BCB∗t + b
G,CB∗
t + Φ
B∗
t

1− ΓB∗t

= ΦL∗t

1− ΓL∗t

,
bG,CB∗t +

[N∗t (φ− 1) +D∗t ]

1− F

ωB∗t

− bG∗t
 
1− ΓB∗t

=

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG∗t
 
1− ΓL∗t

,
ΓL∗t b
G,CB∗
t +

[N∗t (φ− 1) +D∗t ]

1− F

ωB∗t

− bG∗t
 
1− ΓB∗t

=

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG∗t
 
1− ΓL∗t

,(85)
where in the last equation we have applied the market clearing condition (78).Since equations (84)
and (85) are the same, we have shown that all of the 8 equations above hold for

x+t
∞
t=1
. Hence,
under the condition that the paths ΦB+t , b
G+
t and Φ
L+
t are feasible, i.e. non-negative, any equilib-
rium with bond purchases can be reproduced by an adequate path of lending to banks.Feasibility
requires that BCB+t , b
G,CB+
t , b
G+
t , Φ
B+
t and Φ
L+
t are all non-negative. This condition holds for the
former three sequences as BCB+t = b
G,CB∗
t Γ
L∗
t ≥ 0, b
G,CB+
t = 0 and b
G+
t = b
G∗
t > 0, which again is
an exogenous process. For the latter two this means that the following must hold:
ΦL+t = (N
∗
t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− b¯G∗t ≥ 0 (86)
ΦB+t = [N
∗
t (φ− 1)−D∗t ]

1− F

ωB∗t

−BCB+t ≥ 0 (87)
Substituting for BCB+t in (83), the latter condition (87) reduces to
[N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ]

1− F

ωB∗t

− bG,CB∗t

[N∗t (φ− 1)−D∗t ]

1− F

ωB∗t

(N∗t +D
∗
t )F (ω
L∗
t )− b
G∗
t + b
G,CB∗
t

≥ 0,
(N∗t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− b¯G∗t ≥ 0, (88)
which is identical to (86). So its sufficient to show that (86) holds.Using the ∗−counterpart of
equation (76)
bG,CB∗t + Φ
B∗
t

1− ΓB∗t

= ΦL∗t

1− ΓL∗t

and using the fact that by interbank market clearing ΦB+t Γ
B∗
t = Φ
L+
t Γ
L∗
t we obtain
ΦB∗t = Φ
L∗
t − b
G,CB∗
t
Furthermore, using the ∗−counterpart of equation (75) and (78)
ΦB∗t = (N
∗
t +D
∗
t )F

ωL∗t

− bG∗t
Since ΦB∗t forms part of an equilibrium it must be that Φ
B∗
t ≥ 0. Hence ΦL+t > 0. (86) holds.
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Finally, notice that this path satisfies the condition that bCB+t = 0 if b
G,CB∗
t = 0 and b
G,CB∗
t ≥
bCB+t = b
G,CB∗
t Γ
L∗
t > 0 if b
G,CB∗
t > 0.
B. Complete set of equations
We display below the complete set of equations of the model. We define p∗t ≡ P ∗t /Pt.
B.1 Transitional dynamics
• Households
1 = Λt,t+1
RLt
1 + πt+1
, (89)
Wt =
v(Lt)
u(Ct)
, (90)
Λt,t+1 = β
u(Ct+1)
u(Ct)
(91)
1 = QKt

1− S


It
It−1

− S 


It
It−1

It
It−1

+ Λt,t+1Q
K
t+1S



It+1
It


It+1
It
2
, (92)
Kt =

1− S


It
It−1

It + (1− δ)Ωt−1Kt−1. (93)
• Firms
Yt =
Zt
Δt
L1−αt (Ωt−1Kt−1)
α , (94)
1 = θ (1 + πt)
−1 + (1− θ) (p∗t )
1− , (95)
p∗t =
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
, (96)
Ξ1t =

− 1MtYt + θEtΛt,t+1 (1 + πt+1)

Ξ1t+1, (97)
Ξ2t = Yt + θEtΛt,t+1 (1 + πt+1)
−1
Ξ2t+1, (98)
Δt = (1− θ) (p∗t )
− + θ (1 + πt)

Δt−1, (99)
RAt =
Rkt + (1− δ)QKt
QKt−1
, (100)
Rkt = αMtZt

(1− α)MtZt
Wt
(1−α)/α
, (101)
Lt =


(1− α)ZtMt
Wt
1/α
Ωt−1Kt−1. (102)
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• Banks
QKt Kt =

Ntφ

1− F

ωBt

+ (Nt +Dt)

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

, (103)
Nt = ς

RAt Q
K
t−1Ωt−1Kt−1 −
RBt−1
1+πt
ΦBt−1+
RLt−1
1+πt
ΦLt−1 +
RGt
(1+πt)
bGt−1 −
RDt−1
(1+πt)
Dt−1

, (104)
ωBt =
RBt
RAt+1 (1 + πt+1)
, (105)
ωLt =
RLt
RAt+1 (1 + πt+1)
, (106)
RGt+1 = R
L
t . (107)
RDt =

1− F

ωBt

RBt + F

ωLt

RLt +
F

ωBt

− F

ωLt
 
RAt+1 (1 + πt+1)E

ωt|ωBt > ωt > ωLt
 . (108)
• Interbank market
ΦBt = (Nt (φ− 1)−Dt)

1− F

ωBt

, (109)
ΦLt = (Nt +Dt)F

ωLt

− bGt , (110)
ΓBt = Υ


ΦLt
ΦBt
, 1

, (111)
ΓLt = Υ


1,
ΦBt
ΦLt

, (112)
RBt = ϕtΓ
B
t R
DF
t +

1− ϕtΓBt

RLFt , (113)
RLt = (1− ϕt)ΓLt RLFt +

1− (1− ϕt)ΓLt

RDFt , (114)
ϕt =
1
(ΦBt /Φ
L
t )
λ
+ 1
(115)
• Central bank
RLFt = R
DF
t + χ (116)
RDFt = max

ρ(RDFt−1) + (1− ρ)

R¯ + υ (πt − π¯)

, 1− κ

, (117)
bG,CBt + Φ
B
t

1− ΓBt

= ΦLt

1− ΓLt

, (118)
bG,CBt = (1− ζ) bG,CBt−1 + ζb
G,CB
+ npt + ζ(b
G,CB
t−1 − b
G,CB
)rit, (119)
• Government
b = bG,CBt + b
G
t , (120)
RGt =
ζ + (1− ζ)QGt
QGt−1
. (121)
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• Aggregate constraint
Ωt ≡
φ

1− F

ωBt

E

ω | ω ≥ ωBt

φ [1− F (ωBt )] + Nt+DtNt [F (ω
B
t )− F (ωLt )]
+
Nt+Dt
Nt

F

ωBt

− F

ωLt

E

ω | ωLt ≤ ω < ωBt

φ [1− F (ωBt )] + Nt+DtNt [F (ω
B
t )− F (ωLt )]
,(122)
Yt = Ct + It (123)
There are 35 equations and 35 endogenous variables: Yt, QKt , It, Ct, Kt, Nt, Wt, Lt,Λt,t+1, Mt,
πt, p∗t , Ξ
1
t , Ξ
2
t , Δt, R
A
t , R
k
t , R
L
t , R
B
t , R
DF
t , R
LF
t , R
G
t , R
D
t , Γ
B
t , Γ
L
t , Φ
L
t , Φ
B
t ,ϕt, ω
B
t , ω
L
t , b
G,CB
t , b
G
t ,
Dt, Ωt, Q
G
t .
B.2 Steady-state with zero inflation
• Households
RL =
1
β
,
Λ = β,
W =
v(L)
u(C)
,
Q = 1,
I = K [1− (1− δ)Ω] .
• Firms
Yt = (ΩK)
α L1−α,
Δ = 1,
p∗ = 1,
Ξ1 =

(− 1) (1− θβ)MY,
Ξ2 =
Y
(1− θβ) ,
M =
(− 1)

,
Rk = αMZ

(1− α) (− 1)Z
W 
(1−α)/α
,
RA = Rk + (1− δ) ,
L =


(1− α)Z (− 1)
W 
1/α
ΩK.
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• Banks
K =

Nφ

1− F

ωB

+ (N +D)

F

ωB

− F

ωL

,
Nt = ς

RAΩK −RBΦB+
RLΦL +RGbG −RDD

,
ωB =
RB
RA
,
ωL =
1
βRA
,
RG = RL,
RDt =

1− F

ωB

RB + F

ωL

RL+
F

ωB

− F

ωL
 
RA (1 + π)E

ω|ωB > ω > ωL .
• Interbank market
ΦB = (N (φ− 1)−D)

1− F

ωB

,
ΦL = (N +D)F

ωL

− bG
ΓB = Υ


ΦL
ΦB
, 1

,
ΓL = Υ


1,
ΦB
ΦL

,
RB = R¯− ΓBϕχ,
RL = R¯−

1− (1− ϕ)ΓL

χ,
ϕ =
1
(ΦB/ΦL)λ + 1
• Central bank
RLF = R¯,
RDF = R¯− χ,
bG,CB + bCB + ΦB

1− ΓB

= ΦL

1− ΓL

,
bG,CB = b
G,CB
.
• Government
b = bG,CB + bG,
QG =
ζ
1
β
+ ζ − 1
	 .
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• Aggregate constraint
Ω =
φ[1−F (ω)]E(ω|ω≥ωB)
φ[1−F (ωB)]+[F (ωB)−F (ωL)](1+D/N)+
[F(ωB)−F(ωL)]E(ω|ωL≤ω<ωB)(1+D/N)
φ[1−F (ωB)]+[F (ωB)−F (ωL)](1+D/N)
,
Y = C + I.
C. Additional figures
Figure 9: This figure shows the evolution of further variables in the experiments illustrated in figure
6. The purpose of this figure is to show that by controlling nominal bond holdings the central
bank can implicitly control real bond holdings and the ratio bG,CBt /Φ
B
t . In fact, movements in
nominal bond holdings bG,CBt Pt are translated almost proportionally into movements in b
G,CB
t /Φ
B
t .
Notice that for this ratio the price level plays no role. Hence any deviation from a proportional
adjustement is due to movements in ΦBt . However, for our calibration the movements of Φ
B
t , which
arise in general equilibrium, are relatively small.
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Figure 10: This figure shows the relationship between the interbank-deposit facility rate spread and
the amount of excess reserves for 4 major currency areas. It documents that similar relationships
between excess reserves and the interbank-DFR spread hold in the Eurozone, the US, Japan and
the UK. The plot for Japan is cut at 25% (2009) for better visual comparability. For the US we
report the spread between the Fed funds rate and the interest rate on excess reserves. Note that
the Fed did not pay any interest on excess reserves prior to 2008. We plot data since 1999. For
Japan we show the spread between the Japan Uncollateralized Overnight rate and the interest
on excess reserves, which was introduced only in 2008. We use data from 1997 untill 2016, when
the BoJ changed its operational framework and introduced a 3 tier reserve remuneration system.
This sample includes Japans first experiement with balance sheet expansion 2002-2006. The plot
for Japan is cut at 25% (2009) for better visual comparability. For the UK we report the spread
between the SONIA and the interest rate on reserves (there is no reserve requirement). We plot
data since the monetary policy framework change of 2006. The data is weekly and is taken from
datastream. GDP is linearly interpolated based on quarterly data. Reserves for Japan before 2006
are interpolated based on monthly data. Colours indicate time from the beginning of each sample
(blue) to the end (red). Notice that for all countries but the Euro zone the interbank-DFR spread
did actually become slightly negative due to the fact that there are some agents in the respective
money markets that do not have access to the deposit facility, a detail that we abstacted from in
the model.
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D. Data
To derive the stylized balance sheet structure, which serves as a target in our calibration, we
use public data from the ECB on the "aggregate balance sheet of the MFI sector". This data set
documents the aggregate composition of the balance sheet of all monetary and financial institutions
in the euro area at monthly frequency. Furthermore, we added data on reserves from the ECB’s
"daily liquidity conditions" dataset. We focus on post-euro pre-crisis data (1999-2007) and average
the monthly data across time.
To derive our stylized balance sheet, we treat the different asset and liability classes as follows:
On the asset side we abstract from 0.7% of reserves (most of which arerequired reserves). Claims
on the private sector are the sum of loans and securities with private, non-MFI counterparties
plus investment fund shares, equity, nonfinancial assets and remaining liabilities (for the latter 4
categories there is no information about counterparties). Claims on the government are loans and
securities with the government counterparties. To calculate interbank claims we use loans and
securities with the MFI non central bank counterparties. However this series includes intra-group
positions. A series net of intra-group positions is available only from 2014, but not for our sample
period. Therefore we adjust the series including intra-group positions by a factor reflecting the
average share of non-intra-group claims from 2014 till 2018. On the liabilities side we abstract
from 1.3% liabilities to the central bank, mainly MROs and from 10% of "remaining liabilities"
which we can’t clasify. As deposits we define the sum of deposits with counterparts other than
MFIs, plus securities, which are not liabilities to other MFIs, according to information from the
asset side. Equity corresponds to capital and reserves. The remaining types of liabilities should
correspond to interbank liabilities, however, since they do not add up exactly to the same number
as for the asset side, we disregard them. To arrive to the liabilities side of the balance sheet in the
text, we set the interbank liabilities equal to interbank assets, and divide the rest of the liabilities
side such as to match the ratio of equity to deposits, as defined above.
For figures 1 and 4, we combine the "daily liquidity conditions" dataset with quartely data on
Euro area GDP and daily policy and EUREPO rates. All data are from the ECB. The data is
aggregated at weekly frequency. GDP is interpolated for this purpose.
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